Northwestern University School of Law
Public Law and Legal Theory Papers
Year 

Paper 

Reflections on the Law and Economics of
Copyright Scope and its Implications for Fair
Use
Matthew J. Sag∗

∗

Northwestern University School of Law, msag@luc.edu
This working paper is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be commercially reproduced without the permission of the copyright holder.
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art42
Copyright c 2005 by the author.

Reflections on the Law and Economics of
Copyright Scope and its Implications for Fair
Use
Matthew J. Sag

Abstract

Uncertainty as to the optimum extent of protection has generally limited the capacity of law and economics to translate economic theory into coherent doctrinal
recommendations in the realm of copyright. The article explores the relationship
between copyright scope and welfare from a theoretical perspective to develop
a framework for evaluating specific doctrinal recommendations in copyright law.
This analysis of copyright scope establishes that (1) the efficiency of private ordering is the key determinant of the ideal level of copyright scope; (2) the complexity
of the welfare-scope relationship is such that we are unlikely to be able to ascertain
a generalizable optimal level of copyright scope – the relationship will clearly be
subject to substantial variation, both within and between industries; (3) doctrinal
recommendations which aim to optimize copyright scope in the abstract but do
not account for the effect of a doctrinal change on transaction costs or uncertainty
are necessarily incomplete.
This article bridges the gap between the traditional law and economics of copyright and specific doctrinal analysis, applying the above conclusions as metrics for
assessing doctrinal proposals. The usefulness of applying these metrics in either
rejecting or improving doctrinal recommendations is illustrated with reference to
the predominant law and economics theories of fair use.
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INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty as to the optimum extent of protection has frequently limited the
capacity of law and economics to translate economic theory into coherent doctrinal
recommendations in the realm of copyright. William Landes and Richard Posner’s
foundational article, An Economic Analysis of Copyright, seeks to describe the operation of
copyright by analyzing the extent of copyright protection, broadly defined.1 Although the
significance of their work is beyond question, there are a number of problems with the single
variable model which suggest that it is due for reconsideration. The core difficulty with the
Landes and Posner approach is that knowledge of the optimum level of copyright protection
does not translate directly into the types of doctrinal decisions that judges have to make.
The first aspect of the single variable model’s indeterminacy relates to the trade-off
between scope and duration. From an economic perspective, copyright protection is made
up of two variables, scope and duration—consequently, conclusions as to optimum
protection do not suggest which of the infinite number of combinations of scope and
duration should be adopted. Assuming that our core interest lies in the economic analysis of
copyright doctrine, this layer of indeterminacy can be avoided simply by treating duration as
exogenous. Treating duration as exogenous begins to address that problem, but only to
reveal a second layer of indeterminacy relating to the composition of copyright scope. Just as
copyright protection is composed of both scope and duration, copyright scope itself
represents the combined effects of numerous copyright doctrines, such as the ideaexpression distinction, the requirement for substantial similarity and the doctrine of fair use.2

1 William Landes and Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325
(1989). Landes and Posner have recently expanded on their foundational work in their recent book, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003). Changes and extensions to the Landes and
Posner model are noted herein to the extent they are relevant.
2 See note __ infra and accompanying text.
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Each of these doctrines plays a vital role in determining copyright scope—thus, any
assessment of the optimum level of scope will also be doctrinally indeterminate, as it too
could be achieved through an infinite number of combinations of its various components.
The compositional indeterminacy of copyright scope (and copyright protection more
generally) means that economic analysis of copyright doctrines must consider both the
optimal level of copyright scope and the efficiency of individual doctrines used to implement
that scope.
The traditional analysis of the optimum level of copyright protection provides a
framework for understanding the trade-offs between the benefit of monopoly incentives and
the cost of monopoly pricing.3 In contrast, focusing on copyright scope allows us to focus
more directly on the effect of copyright on cumulative innovation. The model of the welfare
effects of copyright scope developed in this article concentrates on the trade-offs between
initial authors and follow-on authors.4 One clear advantage of modifying the broader notion
of copyright protection to exclude duration is that it frames economic analysis of copyright
in the same terms as legal analysis. Copyright scope does not solve the compositional
ambiguity of the broader model, but its aggregation of doctrinal questions is not completely
unrealistic. Resolving copyright disputes frequently involves the simultaneous application of
a number of different doctrines, but the ultimate question a court has to decide is always the
same: does the defendant’s use violate the plaintiff’s rights?
The recent eleventh circuit decision in SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.5 serves as
an example. In that case, the copyright owner of Gone With the Wind (GWTW), claimed
Landes and Posner, supra note 1.
This is not ignored in Landes and Posner’s original work, but nor is it their focus, see Landes and
Posner, supra note 1, at 325. Mark Lemley has directly addressed the effect of copyright doctrines on sequential
innovation in a comparison to patent law. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 993 (1997).
5 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
3
4
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that a critical reinterpretation in the form of a new novel, The Wind Done Gone (TWDG),
was an infringement of copyright. The Court of Appeals found held that TWDG was
substantially similar to the GWTW because of its extensive use of the characters, settings and
story line of the original.6 Nonetheless, the court found that the new book was a specific
criticism of and rejoinder to the perceived racism of the original and was thus protected by
copyright’s fair use doctrine.7 The court’s decision limited the scope of the copyright
owner’s rights. But that same decision could have been reached by concluding that the two
works lacked substantial similarity, rather than relying on fair use. As illustrated, almost every
copyright case involves numerous doctrinal issues, but only one outcome.
This article builds on previous scholarship questioning the scope of copyright,8 and
extends that analysis into a more systematic inquiry within a law and economics framework.
Existing scholarship tends to focus on either the public goods nature of information or the
positive externalities which result from information production,9 whereas this article focuses
on the relationship between copyright scope and doctrinal efficiency.
The copyright literature is rife with assertions that copyright is either unnecessary or
too broad in specific applications, and that various doctrinal levers should be employed to

Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1271.
8 See e.g. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 Tex. L. Rev 1031 (2005); Brett
M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 917 (2005);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs. 33 (2003); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF
THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper
Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 561 (2000); LAWRENCE
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999); Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in
Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management”, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 462 (1998); Lawrence Lessig,
Intellectual Property and Code, 11 St. John's J. Legal Comm. 635 (1996); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's
Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 483, 491-92 (1996); Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil
Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283 (1996).
9 Building on the work of Lawrence Lessig and many others, Brett Frischmann developes a
comprehensive theory of the role of uncaptured positive externalities in his recent work in infrastructure. Brett
M. Frischmann, supra note 8.
6
7
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remedy those excesses. 10 Even if we accept that copyright doctrines should be used as levers
to more perfectly tailor copyright scope, we still need a mechanism to select which lever to
pull and to understand when the costs of such tailoring are likely to exceed the benefits. This
article bridges the gap between general analysis of the desirable level of copyright scope and
specific doctrinal recommendations by developing and then applying a set of metrics for
assessing doctrinal proposals. The usefulness of applying these metrics in either rejecting or
improving doctrinal recommendations is illustrated with reference to the predominant law
and economics theories of fair use.
Part I reviews the fundamental law and economics accounts of copyright, and
frames some of the core copyright doctrines in terms of their relationship to copyright scope.
Part II explores the limits of the traditional single variable model, the advantages of explicitly
framing economic analysis in terms of copyright scope, and the importance of doctrinal
efficiency. It then analyses the essential elements of the relationship between scope and
welfare to develop a law and economics framework for evaluating specific doctrinal
proposals. Part III then applies that framework to a critique of the current law and
economics of fair use.

PART I – BACKGROUND: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COPYRIGHT
This part first introduces the essentials of the law and economics of copyright.
Traditional law and economics provides a rationale for both the existence of exclusive rights

10 See e.g. Stacey L. Dogan and Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law and Subject Matter Specificity: The Case Of
Computer Software, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203 (2005) (Noting that a number of courts have significantly
adapted copyright doctrines to deal with special features of the computer software market. Concluding that
these adaptations have, by and large, positively sought to strike a balance between incentive and access.) Lisa P.
Ramsey, Intellectual Property Rights in Advertising (working paper 2005). Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and
Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539 (2003) (Finding that because
“consumer copying does little to reduce the incentives for creation because, for the most part, the creation of
music is not funded by the sale of copies of that music.”)
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over information, in the form of copyright, and for the limited nature of those rights. This
part then argues that the primary concerns of economic analyses of copyright, the desirability
and efficiency of copyright, are ultimately issues of copyright scope. This review is
unnecessary for readers who are familiar with the law and economics of copyright.
A. The Peculiar Qualities of Information: The Law and Economics of
Copyright
The basic dilemma of intellectual property is encapsulated by Stewart Brand’s
observation that “Information Wants To Be Free. Information also wants to be expensive.”11
Information wants to be free in the sense that, once produced, information is cheap to copy,
distribute and recombine. Information wants to be expensive in the sense that for
information producers to recover their fixed costs of creation, they need to be able to charge
more than just the low marginal cost of copying which results from a competitive market. In
its pure form, information is a public good, meaning that it is both non-excludable and
nonrivalrous.12 The non-excludable nature of information means that those who produce it
often find it difficult to keep the benefits to themselves.13
Consider the following example. Amy, a budding novelist, plans to write a novel at
an expected initial cost $100 (called the “cost of expression”). Amy also expects that, once
written, it will only cost her $1 to make copies of her novel for distribution. There are 10
potential buyers of Amy’s work, each with a different valuation ranging from Bill, for whom
the novel is worth $20 to Kevin for whom the novel is worth only $11. If Amy was able to
sell 10 copies of her novel at $11 each, she would be able to recover both her initial cost of

11 STEWART BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE FUTURE AT MIT (1987). Information does not
“want” anything in the cognitive sense, but it does have certain tendencies and characteristics that can be
usefully summarized by recourse to such animist terms.
12 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 157–159 (2004).
13 Id.
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expression and her marginal cost (the cost of printing each additional volume).
Unfortunately for Amy she is unlikely to be able to charge that price because once she sells a
copy to her first customer, Bill, he will also be able to make copies and offer to sell them to
the remaining customers. Bill’s cost of expression is zero, since he did not write the novel,
so Bill can make a profit by selling at any price above his marginal cost of copying. If Amy
can’t stop Bill free-riding on her work, she will abandon the idea of becoming a novelist and
pursue an alternative career instead, a sub-optimal outcome for both Amy and her customers.
Amy’s story illustrates the classic economic rationale for the creation of exclusive
rights in information in general and copyright in particular. Without the legal artifact of
exclusivity, Amy’s competitors will face a lower average cost of production for her novel
than she does.14 Consequently, faced with the choice between creating and copying, it makes
more sense to copy. To put it another way, in a competitive market, the market price will be
that of the lowest cost producer, which the author will never be. As such, without some
mechanism to appropriate the benefits of their investments, authors and publishers will
under-invest in the production of information products.15
The function of copyright protection in resolving this problem in relation to
expressive works is well understood.16 Copyright rights allow an author to internalize more

This is based on the assumption that both parties face the same marginal cost. But even if the
subsequent producer has a higher marginal cost than the author, he will still have a lower average cost, as long
as his marginal cost is less than the original author’s marginal cost plus her average fixed costs.
15 This assumes that the failure of the author to fully capture the benefits of her work distorts her
allocation of resources. As discussed below, this may not always be the case, see note __ and accompanying
text.
16 See MENELL, PETER S. AND SCOTCHMER, SUZANNE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, IN THE
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, A. MITCHELL POLINSKY AND STEVEN SHAVELL (eds), Forthcoming
http://ssrn.com/abstract=741424. Note also that government grants of exclusive rights in information are not
the only solution to this problem. There are in fact a number of proposals to replace intellectual property with
prizes and government subsidies. See for example, Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus
Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & Econ. 525 (2001); Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 Vand. L.
Rev. 115 (2003).
14
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of the benefits of her creations; in economic terms, copyright facilitates the internalization of
a work’s positive externalities and limits free riding.17
It is important to note the functionalism of this explanation: under this view, the
exclusive rights vested in authors do not exist by virtue of natural or inherent rights, they are
simply a means to an end. Copyright’s constitutional mandate is widely regarded as the
establishment of incentives, not for the personal enrichment of authors, but as a stimulus to
their contribution to the total good.18 As the Supreme Court has commented on a number of
occasions, the constitutional authority for copyright is expressly for the purpose of the
promotion of science and useful arts, and copyright rewards to authors are means to that
end.19
Various regimes of intellectual property address the non-excludability of information
by making certain classes of information legally exclusive, even though they cannot make
them actually exclusive. However, the exclusive rights established by regimes such as
copyright only address one half of the public good problem of information. The other half of
the public good problem, the nonrivalrous nature of information, must still be accounted for.
A nonrivalrous good is one for which one person’s use does not affect the value of any other
person’s use. For example, while a photographic print is a tangible physical object, it also
embodies creative expression. If I take the print from your living room, you are deprived of
the enjoyment of seeing it there; on the other hand, if I merely reproduce the print, you still
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. No. 2 (1967).
(350). A positive externality arises when at least some benefits of an activity spill over to parties not directly
involved in the activity. In contrast, free riders are actors who obtain the benefits of an activity, but do not share
its costs. The “free rider problem” is the question of how to prevent free riding from taking place, or at least
limit its effects.
18 See e.g. Lemley, supra note 4, at 993.
19 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing
that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in
the proliferation of knowledge. The profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science.) See also,
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
17
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have the original and yet I now have one too. The photo qua object is rivalrous; the photo
qua artistic expression is non-rivalrous.20
The non-rivalrous nature of information makes the welfare implications of
intellectual property different to those of other forms of property: the efficiency of allocating
property rights in information must be off-set against its resulting under-utilization.21 In
other words, there is a trade-off between the author’s incentive to produce a work and the
public’s interest in access to that work.22
The author’s exclusive rights under copyright law provide a buffer against price
competition.23 This competitive buffer allows the author to charge higher prices than she
otherwise would, which in turn has two immediate effects. First, some consumers remain
willing to purchase the work at a higher price and consequently pay more. Assuming we
value the welfare of both consumers and authors equally, this is simply a wealth transfer and
is welfare neutral. Second, those who are unwilling to pay the higher price are forced to go
without the work in question. Market allocation of scarce recourses to their highest valued
use is usually welfare enhancing, but for nonrivalrous goods, the exclusion of low value users
produces a deadweight loss24 because their consumption is not at the expense of another who

20 Note that the artistic expression aspect of the work becomes rivalrous if its value lies in part in its
uniqueness. It is for this reason that many photographers release a predetermined limited number of prints of
any given photo.
21 KENNETH J. ARROW, ECONOMIC WELFARE AND THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR
INVENTION, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609,
614 – 15 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962); Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific
Research, 67 J. POLIT. ECON. 297, 297 – 306 (1959).
22 See, Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 3. (The main defect of intellectual property is that it results
in a dead weight loss to consumers).
23 While subsequent authors can offer other works in competition with the author, no one may offer
the exact same work, or a substantially similar work, to the public without the author’s permission. It is the
author’s expectation of the ability to price above marginal cost that induces her investment in production in the
first place. For these purposes, it is not important whether this competitive buffer should be referred to as a
“monopoly” or not. See Ariel Katz, IP, Antitrust, and the Presumption of Market Power: Making Sense of Alleged
Nonsense, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=702462.
24 Deadweight loss refers to any permanent loss of social welfare. See Shavell, supra note 12, at __.
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values the good more. More succinctly, a positive price for a nonrivalrous good necessarily
implies its underutilization in consumption.25
Taking both the non-excludable and non-rivalrous nature of information into
account suggests that there is an inevitable trade-off between efficiency in production and
efficiency in consumption.26 This is essentially a comparison of dynamic benefits and static
costs.27 Copyright has dynamic benefits in that it creates incentives to invest in the creation
of new intellectual and creative works. Copyright has static costs comprised of the consumer
deadweight loss resulting from higher prices, the concentration of market power, and
possible stifling of alternative points of view. In the classic model, the optimal assignment of
copyright rights is determined by a balance the dynamic incentives against static deadweight
losses.28 More recently, scholars have begun to question whether this simple trade-off
between access and incentives describes the full effects of intellectual property. 29 This article
offers one such challenge to the traditional model by emphasizing the centrality of copyright
scope and the importance of doctrinal efficiency.
B. The Elements of Copyright Scope
In contrast to copyright duration, which dictates the period in which any copyright
rights exist, copyright scope refers to the extent of the rights of the copyright owner. Like
duration, copyright scope has greatly expanded over time, but with less uniformity. Since the
statute of Anne in 1710, copyright laws in both England and the U.S. have given authors the
Arrow, supra note 21, at 617. A view echoed by the U.S. Supreme Court: “[Copyright requires] a
difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings
and discoveries on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and
commerce on the other hand.” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
26 Arrow, supra note 21.
27 Id., at 618; Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent
Law, 5 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 29–41 (1991); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 36 – 50 (5th ed. 1998).
28 Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 326.
29 Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decision Architectures, 92 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
(forthcoming 2006). Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=726561.
25
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exclusive right to reproduce their works for a limited period of time. Until the mid-1800s,
however, copyright infringement was limited to verbatim reproduction, or replication with
only very minor changes that were judged to have been made merely to evade the copyright
owner’s rights.30 In other words copyright scope was extremely narrow. For example, in the
1853 case of Stowe v. Thomas, it was held that a dramatization of the novel Uncle Tom's Cabin
did not infringe the author’s rights in the novel.31 Subsequently, copyright scope has greatly
expanded to the point where broad conceptual similarities have been found sufficient to
sustain a finding of infringement.32 Clearly, the Stowe case would be decided differently
today.33
Copyright scope has both a formal legal dimension and an economic dimension.34 In
formal legal terms, scope depends on (i) the extent to which facts and ideas are not
copyrightable, (ii) the extent of similarity required to make non-literal copying actionable, (iii)
the extent to which similarity is accepted as evidence of actual copying and (iv) the extent of
fair use.35 In economic terms, scope can be envisaged spatially, as the distance between the
author’s work and the closest non-infringing substitute.36 Alternatively, scope can be thought

30. Oren Bracha, From Privilege To Print To Ownership Of Works: The Transformation Of American Copyright
Law 1790–1909 (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University Law School) (on file with author) at
36.
31 Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 208 (No. 13,514) (CC ED Pa. 1853).
32 See, e.g. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th
Cir., 1977); Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958 (8th Cir., 2005); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233 & n.25 (3d Cir. 1986).
33 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 245-246 (1990).
34 Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 14. (Noting that legal doctrines do not map directly onto
the economic concepts of breadth.)
35 The extent of secondary liability should probably also be considered to be a fundamental
determinant of copyright scope because it allows the copyright owner to control new technologies of
dissemination and also allows copyright owners to leverage their copyrights into non-copyright markets. This
subject deserves more complete consideration than this article permits. Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as
Innovation Policy (working paper). One could also include the doctrines of originality, functionality and scenes a
faire as separate determinants of copyright scope, although these are not addressed here. See also Menell and
Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 13; Shavell, supra note 12, at 157–159. (Copyright scope determined by similarity,
access, fair use and the derivative works doctrine).
36 See Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113
(1990). See also, Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 14; Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization
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of as determining the cost of entry into the market occupied by the copyrighted work.37 Both
of these economic conceptions of scope assume compliance with the law. A more
complicated question is how to account for the availability of both legal and illegal substitutes
where a substantial body of consumers assigns only a very small discount for a product’s
illegality.
The congruence of the legal and economic dimensions of copyright scope is highly
contingent: in some cases narrow legal rights give rise to broad economic power; in others,
even broad legal rights provide little insulation from competition. Computer software
illustrates both these points: protection of object code from literal copying provides a very
effective shield against piracy; nonetheless, it does not protect any of the functionality of a
program, and so offers very little advantage against would-be imitators.
The key doctrines of copyright are best understood as expanding and limiting the
scope of copyright protection. The remainder of this section reviews the elements of
copyright scope individually from a law and economics perspective.
1. The idea-expression distinction
The first element of copyright scope is the varying robustness with which courts
police the idea expression distinction. At its core, the idea expression distinction holds that
“no author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.”38 As the Supreme Court has
recently commented, copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or information

Approach To Copyright Law, 46 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 33 (2004) (applying the Hotelling and Salop economic
models of product differentiation to copyright); Yoo, supra note 38 (also applying economic models of product
differentiation to copyright, but with different conclusions). See generally Jean Tirole, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1998) at 96 – 131.
37 Nancy T. Gallini, Patent Policy and Costly Imitation, 23 RAND J. ECON. 52 (1992). See also, Menell and
Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 14.
38 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.)
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contained in an author’s work, it merely protects the expression of those ideas and
information.39
The economic rationale for the idea expression distinction is that granting exclusive
rights to the abstract ideas contained in a work would significantly increase both the cost of
expression and the costs of administering copyright. These costs would exceed the incentive
value of allowing broader rights over ideas for at least four reasons.
First, copyright protection of ideas raises the cost of expression for second
generation authors by compelling them to either, (i) develop their own ideas, (ii) license ideas
from copyright owners, (iii) search for ideas in the public domain or (iv) pursue alternative
careers.40 The impact on the cost of expression would depend on the level of abstractness of
the idea in question. The theoretical possibility of copyright in very abstract ideas is unlikely
to translate into a significant cost to future authors because of the large number of basic
ideas already in the public domain; for example, Shakespeare seems to have covered all
possible variations of the boy-meets-girl story. But at a slightly lower level of abstraction,
there is a real danger that copyright protection of ideas would stymie the efforts of the next
generation of authors and create an ‘ideas thicket’ of overlapping rights to be cleared.41
Second, the protection of ideas would significantly increase the administrative costs
of copyright. “Courts would have to define each idea, set its boundaries, determine its
overlap with other ideas, and, most difficult of all, identify the idea in the work of the alleged
39 Eldred

v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–219 (2003). See also, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880)
(accounting form used to record information rather than to explain information not eligible for copyright
protection).
40 This article uses the term “first generation author” to refer to the producer of an original work, and
“second generation author” to refer to an author who combines new material with one or a number of existing
works to make a new work. Clearly, any given author may be a first generation author in relation to her
successors, but a second generation author in relation to her predecessors.
41 Similar to a “patent thicket” whereby a tangle of overlapping upstream patent rights hinders the
efficient development of downstream products because those seeking to commercialize a new technology must
obtain licenses from multiple patentees. See, Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools,
and Standard-Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL'Y AND THE ECON. 6-8 (2001), at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf.
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infringer.”42 Copyright protection of ideas would also increase the difficulty of differentiating
infringement from independent discovery, discussed in more detail below.
Third, the extent to which the copyright protection of ideas would lead to any
additional incentive to create is highly questionable. Basic ideas are rarely a product in
themselves. No one pays $12 to be told to imagine that a family of children helps a stranded
alien return home, but a finished product containing the artful expression of that same plot
may be worth millions in the form of a movie, film or video game.43 Ideas typically represent
a small fraction of the cost of their expression;44 consequently extending copyright protection
further back along the continuum from expression to ideas is unlikely to have a significant
incentive advantage. Such protection may accelerate development of “new” ideas but it is
also likely to impede their further development. Another reason to doubt the incentive
effects of copyright protection in ideas is simply that very few ideas are actually new. The
greater the level of abstraction protected, the more likely this is to be true.
Fourth, copyright protection of ideas would encourage rent seeking and the diversion
of resources from execution to initiation of new works.45 If there are substantial rewards to
be had merely for conceiving of basic ideas, it might be more attractive to act as a kind of
plot-speculator, than working out the full expression of an idea. Plot-speculators could then
extract licensing fees from those people who actually made finished expressive products. For
these reasons, the strength of the idea expression distinction is a key determinant of
copyright scope.

Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 349.
The film E.T.: the Extra-Terrestrial was at one point the highest grossing film of all time.
44 Although there are counter-examples where the idea and the expression are essentially merged such
as Newton’s Third Law of Motion, or Einstein’s Theory of General Relativity.
45 Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 349. An author by the name of Ashleigh Brilliant has been
astonishingly successful at this kind of rent seeking. Brilliant “coined” 7500 aphorisms and mounted more than
a hundred successful copyright infringement suits. See Michael Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and AntiCompetitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV 509, 518 (2003).
42
43
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2. Substantial similarity
The requirement of substantial similarity is the second element of copyright scope
and is closely related to, but distinct from, the idea expression distinction. Copyright
infringement requires both actual copying of the original work and that the subsequent work
be substantial similar to that work.46
Like many other areas of copyright law, the substantial similarity requirement
presents courts with a difficult line-drawing exercise.47 As Judge Learned Hand explained in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., “[i]t is of course essential to any protection of literary
property, whether at common-law or under the statute, that the right cannot be limited
literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations. That has never
been the law, but, as soon as literal appropriation ceases to be the test, the whole matter is
necessarily at large …”48 In many cases, courts simply apply an ordinary observer test to
determine substantial similarity. For example, the ninth circuit has held that two works “are
substantially similar where the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities,
would be disposed to overlook them, and regard the aesthetic appeal of the two works as the
same.”49 However, because substantial similarity only applies to protectable expression and
not the works as a whole, some courts have attempted a more rigorous process of
dissection.50

46 Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 2003) (Even where the fact of copying is
conceded, no legal consequences will follow from that fact unless the copying is substantial.)
47 As Judge Learned Hand commented, the line that separates substantial form insubstantial will always
seem arbitrary, wherever it is drawn. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930). See
also Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (the test for infringement
of a copyright is of necessity vague.)
48 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir., 1930)
49 Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotes and
citations omitted)
50 Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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Substantial similarity also places a key limit on the scope of the copyright owner’s
derivative rights.51 The exclusive right to make derivative works is broad: it includes the right
to translate, abridge or dramatize a pre-existing works, just to name a few. Nonetheless, the
derivative right remains subject to the requirement of substantial similarity.52
Both the idea expression distinction and substantial similarity requirement present
courts with difficult line drawing exercises. What is right level of abstraction? What should be
excluded from a substantial similarity inquiry? How much similarity is too much? How far
should the right to control derivative works be extended? From the perspective of law and
economics, these questions should be resolved with consideration of the costs and benefits
of increasing (or decreasing) copyright scope in mind. If copyright scope is too broad,
subsequent authors will be limited in their freedom to create their own works and society will
not have access to adequate substitutes for the original work. On the other hand, if copyright
scope is too narrow, substitutes for the original author’s work would be too freely available,
and her incentives will be reduced.
3. Actual copying
The third element of copyright scope concerns the application of the requirement for
actual copying as a prerequisite to liability for infringement. There are at least two economic
51 Section 106(2). Section 101 defines a derivative work as follows: “A derivative work is a work based
upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”
52 Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (a work is not derivative unless it has
been substantially copied from the prior work). See also 1 Melvin B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright 3.01 at 3-3 (2002). Many have commented that it is hard to see what the derivative right in section
106(2) adds to the reproduction right in section 106(1) of the Copyright Act. Nimmer, Id. See also, Lemley, The
Economics of Improvement, supra note 4, at 1017–1018. Lemley offers three explanations for the separate treatment
of derivatives: (i) section 106(2) may extend the exclusive right to reproduce a work “in copies” to any
reproduction, whether fixed in a tangible medium of expression or not; (ii) the subsection may limit a
consumer’s ability to alter or transform their own copy of the work, notwithstanding the first sale doctrine; and
(iii) in conjunction with section 103, the separate articulation of the derivative right may allow copyright owners
to protect a chain of works more effectively. For example, “Disney might protect a book, a script derived from
that book, a movie made from the script, and stuffed animals derived from the movie, even though the stuffed
animals have no resemblance to anything described in the original book.” Id.
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justifications for the requirement of actual copying. The first is that, given the improbability
of accidental replication of another’s expression, the additional incentive effect of finding the
second author liable in that unlikely event is presumably equally low.53 The second reason is
that, when there is independent creation, there is no free riding on the work of the original
author. If two equally efficient authors independently create the same work, they each face
the same cost of expression and the same average cost. The first author suffers from the
market entry of the second, but only in the same fashion as a seller in any other type of
market place suffers from competition.
Although copyright infringement requires actual copying as a matter of law, it is often
proven circumstantially. A copyright plaintiff may prove a defendant’s copying by showing
that (i) the defendant had access to the plaintiff's copyrighted work and (ii) that defendant’s
work is substantially similar to the plaintiff's copyrightable material.54 For this reason, the
requirement of actual copying is closely linked to the question of substantial similarity, often
muddlingly so. The similarity that makes copying actionable and the similarity that evidences
copying in the first place should be distinct legal concepts; nonetheless, they are often mixed
together.55 Nevertheless, the actual copying requirement is a distinct element of copyright
scope. Whereas substantial similarity affects scope by delineating the extent to which similar
substitutes can exist in the market, the requirement of actual copying affects scope by
rewarding independent creation regardless of the extent of similarity.

Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 345. Although, as Douglas Adams observed in The Hitchhiker’s
Guide to the Galaxy, an infinite number of monkeys typing at random, for an infinite period of time, will
eventually produce complete works of William Shakespeare. Nonetheless, monkeys are not known to be
especially litigious.
54 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir., 1946).
55 See, Lunney, Reexamining, supra note 8.
53
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4. Fair use
The fourth element of copyright scope is the doctrine of fair use. Section 107 of the
Copyright Act states that “the fair use of a copyrighted work is not an infringement of
copyright.”56 Moving beyond a circular definition of fair use is surprisingly difficult. The fair
use doctrine operates in a contextual fashion as a negative definition: if something is fair use,
it is not copyright infringement.57 Time-shifting broadcast television for later viewing,58
copying part of a work in order to make a parody of it,59 making thumbnail versions of
images available on the internet as part of a picture based search engine,60 and reverse
engineering computer software,61 are all examples of fair use. These diverse fact patterns
have at least two points in common: first, in each case the defendant reproduced a substantial
part (or all) of the original work, such that there was no question of copying, substantial
similarity or the idea expression distinction; second, the nature of the activity of the
defendant was such that their copying was held to be non-infringing.62 These cases and many
others illustrate a more general point: the rights of copyright owners may be broadly
expressed, but they are not absolute.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2005). The statutory codification of the fair use doctrine requires courts to consider
four factors in determining whether a use is fair: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion taken; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work. Id.
57 Both the statutory definition of fair use (a use that is not a violation of copyright) and the express
limitation of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner (subject to section 107 (fair use)) indicate that “fair use
should be considered an affirmative right… , rather than merely an affirmative defense.” SunTrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d
1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996). However, fair use is commonly referred to an affirmative defense because of
the procedural necessity that the specifics of the fair use claim be raised by the defendant. See Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
58 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
59 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
60 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
61 Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000).
62 The question in Sony, was whether the maker of the video cassette recorder was liable for the
potentially infringing actions of end users. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984).
56
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Fair use affects copyright scope by limiting the rights of copyright owners in some
situations. Fair use encapsulates a judgment that in certain contexts, any reduction in a first
generation author’s incentive to produce original works that allowing an unauthorized use
may cause, is outweighed by the benefits of that access. However, fair use has arguably
served to protect the rights of copyright owners by enabling the otherwise broad scope and
duration of their rights embodied in the current Copyright Act.63 The predominant law and
economics theories of fair use are examined in detail in Part III.
The purpose of this Part was acquaint the reader with some of the more basic
concepts of the law and economics of copyright, and also to illustrate how copyright’s core
doctrines can be reframed in terms of their relationship to copyright scope. These concepts
provide the foundation for Part II, which explores the limits of the traditional single variable
model, the advantages of explicitly framing economic analysis in terms of copyright scope,
and the importance of doctrinal efficiency. Part II also analyses the essential elements of the
relationship between scope and welfare to develop a law and economics framework for
evaluating specific doctrinal proposals.

PART II – COPYRIGHT SCOPE AND DOCTRINAL EFFICIENCY
A. The limits of the single variable model
Landes and Posner’s article, An Economic Analysis of Copyright, describes the operation
of copyright by analyzing the extent of copyright protection, broadly defined. The Landes
and Posner framework has been very influential, but the limits of their analysis discussed in

See Matthew J. Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 11
MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 381 (2005).
63
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this article suggest that some revision of the classic model is due.64 The core difficulty with
the Landes and Posner approach is that knowledge of the optimum level of copyright
protection does not translate directly into the types of doctrinal decisions that judges have to
make.65
The traditional single variable model’s focus on overall copyright reward comes at the
cost of significant indeterminacy. The Landes and Posner model treats copyright protection
as a single variable (Z) and examines the relationship between Z, the cost of producing
copyrightable works, and the number of works produced.66 Landes and Posner developed
their model as a vehicle through which to examine the field of copyright as a whole from an
economic standpoint, and to see to what extent copyright law could be explained as a means
for promoting the efficient allocation of resources.67 In that context, the model serves its
purpose, but as a vehicle for translating economic analysis into doctrinal recommendations,
the model is limited by its own generality.68
The aggregation of scope and duration into a single variable makes analysis of the
level of copyright protection doctrinally indeterminate. From an economic perspective,

64 This is not the first article to make this suggestion. For example, Glynn Lunney suggests that
incentive access paradigm justifies any level of copyright protection because benefits of incentive and costs of
limiting access oppose each other with equal force. Lunney, Reexamining, supra note 8, 486 (1996), See also,
Yoo, supra note 38, at 222.
65 This is the same observation that Merges and Nelson made with respect to patent law 15 years ago,
but its application to copyright has rarely been systematically pursued. Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson,
On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 875 (1990). Mark Lemley’s comparison of the
treatment of incremental innovation in patent and copyright comes closest. See Lemley, Economics of
Improvement, supra note __.
66 Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 325.
67 Id., at 325.
68 Landes and Posner do undertake a significant normative analysis of copyright doctrine, but that
analysis is largely disconnected from their model. Additionally, the author’s doctrinal recommendations are
primarily in the form of ex post justifications for existing doctrines. Id., at 344 – 363. See James Boyle, A Theory of
Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 1413, 1447 (1992) (“Landes
and Posner describe copyright as constructed by the tension between the need to grant legally protected
interests to authors in order to motivate them and the need to limit the rights of authors so as to allow future
creators legal access to the raw materials they need. This seems reasonable enough, but it also leaves them
dangerously close to the mushy “balancing” analysis from which economics was supposed to provide
surcease.”)
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copyright protection can be divided into two distinct variables: the scope of rights and their
duration. In this respect, conclusions regarding the optimum level of protection do not
suggest which of the infinite number of combinations of scope and duration should be
adopted.
Assuming that our core interest lies in the economic analysis of individual copyright
doctrines,69 this layer of indeterminacy can be avoided simply by treating duration as
exogenous. Although duration is clearly an important component of the author’s expected
reward, leaving duration out of the model has very little distorting effect because of the
extraordinary length of modern copyright. The first American Copyright Act (1790)
established a meager copyright term of only 14 years from the date of a work’s publication;
that term was renewable for an additional 14 years if the author survived the first term.70
Since that time, the duration of copyright protection has steadily expanded. It was extended
to 42 years in 1831,71 and again to 56 years in 1909.72 In 1976, Congress both extended the
term of copyright and changed the method for its calculation. For the works of identified
natural persons, the 1976 Act extended copyright term from the moment of the work’s
creation until 50 years after the author’s death.73 For anonymous works, pseudonymous
works, and works made for hire, the 1976 Act provided a term of 75 years from publication
or 100 years from creation, whichever expired first.74 In 1988, Congress enacted the Sonny

69 Which is not the primary purpose for which Landes and Posner designed their model. Landes and
Posner, supra note 1, at 325.
70 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790 Act).
71 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439 (1831 Act) (28 years from publication,
renewable for an additional 14 years).
72 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23-24, 35 Stat. 1080-1081 (1909 Act). (28 years from publication,
renewable for an additional 28 years).
73 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2005).
74 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2005).
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Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) which extended the terms of all existing and
future copyrights by a further 20 years.75
The justification for these extensions is suspect from an economic perspective,
particularly the most recent one affected by the CTEA. The low probability that a work will
remain commercially valuable three quarters of a century (or more) after its publication,
combined with standard assumptions about the time value of money, render the added
incentive provided by the CTEA “virtually worthless.”76 Nonetheless, it seems likely that the
change from a 75 year term to a 95 year term (as in the case of a work made for hire) may
not be that significant from an ex ante perspective. One way to put the current duration of
copyright into perspective is to contrast its net present value to that of perpetual copyright.
According to the economists’ brief in Eldred,77 the copyright terms provided by the CTEA
are equal to 99.8% of the value of a perpetual copyright. At first glance this seems
remarkable, the term of copyright is now so long that it is barely distinguishable from infinity.
But, note that on the same calculations, the terms established under the 1976 Act were equal
to 99.4% of the value of a perpetual copyright.78 Arguably, both these terms are too long,
but even if one takes that view, it is hard to see that a term equal to 99.8% of perpetual
copyright is significantly more problematic than one equal to 99.4%, or perpetual copyright.

For works created by identified natural persons, the term now lasts from creation until 70 years after
the author’s death, see 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2005). For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works
made for hire, the term is 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever expires first, 17
U.S.C. § 302(c) (2005).
76 Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV.
2187, 2236-37 (2000) (describing the CTEA extension as “virtually worthless” from an incentive perspective,
and “a classic instance of almost pure rent-seeking legislation.”). See also, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 255
(U.S., 2003) (Justice Breyer, dissenting); George A. Akerlof et. al. – Brief of Amici Curiae George A. Akerlof et
al., at 2, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (No. 01-618) (term extension offers less than a 1% increase in
the net present value of the pre 1998 term), available at
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/amici/economists.pdf.
77 Akerlof, Id.
78 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 210 (2003).
75
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Moreover, the “effective copyright life”79of a work may be unrelated to its statutory life
because the market for most copyright works fades long before the end of their term. Ex
ante, it is copyright scope that largely determines a work’s expected “effective copyright
life.”80
Treating duration as exogenous to economic models of copyright is also expedient
given that duration appears to be determined solely with reference to political criteria, not
social welfare criteria.81 After Eldred, it is very clear that no matter how ill-conceived the
recent CTEA might have been, nothing written by economists or law professors is likely to
change the clear congressional policy in favor of long (and expanding) copyright terms. It is
equally clear that efforts to limit Congressional power to implement that policy through
judicial review have come to naught. In 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the CTEA and rejected the petitioners’ argument that the term extension violated the
“limited times” prescription of the Copyright Clause.82
The appropriate combination of duration and scope in copyright is an interesting
intellectual puzzle, but for the reasons given above, copyright scope should be the focus of
our analysis, taking the current (extraordinarily long) duration as given.83

79 Adapting from O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse’s notion of “effective patent life.” See,
O'Donoghue, T., S. Scotchmer and J.F. Thisse, Patent Breadth, Patent Life and the Pace of Technological Progress, 7
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 1 (1998).
80 See discussion in Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 24 – 25. Landes and Posner have recently
argued in favor of a system of indefinitely renewable copyright protection because of the possibility that
prominent works might be subject to congestion externalities if they were to enter the public domain upon the
expiration of copyright. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 471, 475 (2003).
81 This is the predominant view, there are exceptions. See e.g. Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis,
Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh In On Copyright: The Role Of Theory, Empirics, And Network Effects, 18 HARV. J.
LAW & TEC 435 (2005).
82 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
83 This analysis does not take into account the economic function that formalities once had in
copyright. See, Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004).
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B. Copyright scope as a framework for economic analysis
As a tool of economic analysis, copyright scope has both distinct advantages and
disadvantages compared to the more general notion of copyright protection. The primary
strength of the approach is that it does not require knowledge of the optimum trade-off
between the incentives created by copyright and dead-weight loss of exclusion.84 As such, it
allows us to focus more directly on the effect of copyright on cumulative innovation.85 The
weakness of the model is that there are some important questions relating to the copyright
system as a whole that cannot be addressed without considering the effect of the duration of
rights. But, for the reasons discussed above, treating duration as exogenous has very little
distorting effect in application.
Framing economic analysis in terms of scope is useful because it focuses on the
effect of the law on cumulative innovation. The case for framing economic analysis in terms
of copyright scope echoes Robert Merges and Richard Nelson’s discussion of scope in the
context of patent law.86 Merges and Nelson identify the scope of property rights as a crucial
question for patent law.87 They note that conventional economic analysis stresses the
importance of assigning property rights to mitigate problems relating to externalities but
overlooks the question of how broad property rights should be.88 Merges and Nelson argue

84

See Lunney, supra note__.

85

Merges and Nelson, supra note 65, at 875. For a summary of the literature on patent scope see
Menell and Scotchmer, supra note, 3, at 13 – 16; Note that conclusions regarding patent scope may not directly
translate to copyright because the different nature of the exclusive rights involved. In particular, patent law
allows “blocking patents” whereby a second generation inventor can patent her improvements to the original
inventor’s device, even if she still needs a license from the original inventor to practice the improved invention.
In contrast, under copyright law, the author of an unauthorized derivative work has no rights with respect to
her creation. See, Lemley, Economics, supra note 8, at 991–992.
87 Merges and Nelson, supra note 65, at 875.
88 Id. The appropriate scope of copyright is a topic that has largely been outside the law and economics
framework. See, e.g. Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 8; Boyle, Enclosure supra note 8; Lessig, The Future of
Ideas, supra note 8; Benkler, From Consumers to Users, supra note 8; Lessig, Code, supra note 8; Benkler, Free as
the Air, supra note 8 (1999); Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, supra note 8; Netanel, supra note 8. There are
86
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that “although property rights assignments can make development of an asset more efficient,
the scope of rights is crucial. Property rights that are too narrow will not provide enough
incentive to develop the asset, while overly broad rights will preempt too many competitive
development efforts.”89
Copyright scope controls the level of competition facing the copyright owner in both
first and second generation products. The traditional incentive access paradigm concentrates
on competition in the first generation market, but in many cases the more interesting
questions for copyright relate to the second generation market where first generation
products are inputs for later stage products.90 Copyright scope determines the ability of rival
producers to offer substitutes for the product of the original author, thus the ability to price
over marginal cost. In contrast, copyright duration does not affect the level of competition
during the term; it only determines when the market reverts to free competition. So, while
scope is a question of degree, duration is all or nothing. One implication is that, whereas
even small changes in copyright scope affect every market participant, only works near the
end of their term of copyright protection are likely to be affected by a change in duration.91

notable exceptions, see e.g. Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 8; Frischmann, supra note 8; Abramowicz, supra note
36; Yoo, supra note 38; Cohen, supra note 8; Lunney, Reexamining, supra note 8.
89 Merges and Nelson, supra note 65, at 875.
90 Brett Frischmann’s “infrastructure theory” argues that certain resources generate value when used as
inputs into a wide range of productive processes and that the outputs from these processes are often public and
non-market goods that generate positive externalities. Accordingly, Frischmann sees that there is broad case to
be made for “open access” within a law and economics framework. Frischmann, supra note 8. The importance
of copyrighted works as inputs for later stage products is also a key concern of scholars working outside the law
and economics framework, see supra note 88.
91 The application of copyright scope to questions relating to complete copies requires some
clarification. Complete copies generally present easy cases for copyright law. For simple acts of piracy,
copyright duration is the only significant question. Nonetheless, the fair use doctrine establishes a number of
circumstances where even a complete copy will not infringe the author’s rights. Generally these copies are either
for an intermediate use, such as reverse engineering computer software – see Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v.
Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000); a non-commercial use, such as time-shifting broadcast
television, see Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) – or releasing
information in the public interest – see Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (C.D. Cal.
2004). But not always, see Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
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C. The Welfare Effects of Changes in Copyright Scope
This section explores the relationship between copyright scope and welfare from a
theoretical perspective. 92 Establishing what is known and what is unknown about that
relationship provides a framework for evaluating specific doctrinal recommendations in
copyright law. This method is useful given the number and variety of recommendations that
implicitly rely on some underlying theory the scope-welfare relationship.93 The framework
developed in this article does not provide a basis for evaluating individual cases; rather it
establishes a set of metrics or benchmarks by which to assess specific doctrinal
recommendations. The usefulness of applying these metrics in either rejecting or improving
doctrinal recommendations is illustrated in Part III of this article with reference to the
predominant law and economics theories of fair use.
This section develops a model of the welfare effects of a change in copyright scope in
four stages. First, it begins with a simple intuitive model of the welfare effects of a change in
copyright scope by imagining the consequences of the opposing extremes of copyright
scope: S0 such that only identical works are capable of infringement, and S∞ such that even
the slightest similarity rendered liability for infringement. This simple model leads to the
proposition that the welfare/scope curve is convex, such that the optimum level of copyright
scope is more than S0, but less than S∞.
The second stage considers an entirely different model premised on efficient private
ordering, i.e. the effective market reallocation of rights through licensing or the consolidation
of production into firms. Essentially, the efficient private ordering model rejects the
See Shavell, supra note 12, at 597. The standard economic definition of social welfare is the sum of
all individual utilities, but determining which factors contribute to welfare in the context of copyright is difficult.
For example, one can not simply assume that all books are of equal value, all movies are of equal value, or even
that the average value of books and movies are the same. Furthermore, in the digital age there is no real scarcity
of information, merely a scarcity of useful information.
93 __
92
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conclusion that increasing copyright scope is ever likely to increase the cost of expression
more than it increases the incentive effect. Those advocating an efficient private ordering
model acknowledge that an increase in copyright scope may raise the cost of expression for
second generation authors, but they argue that those costs will, on average, be off-set by their
increased prospective reward.94
The third stage attempts to reconcile the opposing views presented in stages one and
two. The conclusion of the third stage is that the prospect of private ordering does change
the likely welfare effects of an increase in copyright scope, but that there remains an optimal
level of copyright scope that is less than the maximum. Many scholars have reached the same
conclusion observationally.95
The fourth and final stage adds further complexity by arguing that there is no one
welfare-scope relationship, rather different industries, markets, and modes of production will
experience different welfare-scope relationships simultaneously. Empirical assessment of the
likely welfare effects of a change in copyright scope is rendered extremely difficult by the
indeterminacy of copyright scope and the likelihood of inter-industry effects. This suggests
that attempts to calibrate individual copyright doctrines to optimize scope may be more
difficult than previously acknowledged.

See, e.g. Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 16, 23 – 24; Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The
Impact Of Automated Rights Management On Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C.L. REV. 557, 584 (1998); I. Trotter
Hardy, Property in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 217. Note that none of these scholars would literally advocate
an infinite degree of copyright scope. At the most extreme they might argue that any feasible increase in scope
is likely to be a net positive, and even that may be overstating their positions. Nonetheless, as a theoretical
exercise it is important to begin with exploring the limits of the abstract proposition.
95 E.g. Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, supra note 8, at 638 (Arguing that sufficient incentive is
something less than perfect control); Cohen, supra note 8, at 514 (“Incentives to create and limits on
author/owner control are not mutually exclusive, as the argument from redistribution might lead one to think.
Rather, they are complementary means for triangulating “progress.” The trick is to balance the two, and neither
assertions about redistribution nor formulaic prescriptions for maximizing allocative efficiency will help us.)
94
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Stage 1: The simple model
The welfare effects of an increase in copyright scope are uncertain in the abstract.
Like copyright protection more generally, any change in copyright scope will have effects on
(i) the author’s potential reward for the production of a work, (ii) the author’s cost of
expression and (iii) the administrative costs of the copyright system.
In isolation, the prospect of an increased reward should increase the production of
copyrighted works. However, the same expansion of copyright scope may also increase the
author’s cost of expression. For example, faced with a legal regime that required brief
quotations to be licensed, some authors would expend resources on attaining such licenses,
whereas other would find it more economical to avoid that cost by summarizing instead of
quoting. In either case, such a regime increases the cost of expression for second generation
authors. An expansion of copyright scope might also increase the administrative costs of the
copyright system, depending on the nature of the rule in question. For example, a rule that
requires case by case adjudication would tend to cause more cases to be litigated and would
thus increase state expenditure on judges, court houses etc.96 The net effect of increasing
copyright scope will depend on whether the costs of expansion outweigh the benefits, or
vice-versa.
Assume for the moment that the scope of copyright was so narrow as to permit all
but virtually identical reproduction of the original work by a second generation author. In
that case, an expansion of copyright scope would almost certainly be welfare improving, as
the positive effects of increased incentives would dominate any concerns as to the increased
cost of expression. Works remain protected from outright piracy even at relatively high
thresholds of substantial similarity; as that level falls (i.e. less similarity is required to find a
96

This follows from the Priest-Kline model the selection of disputes for litigation. [cite]
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work infringing), the extent to which competitors must differentiate their products from the
work of the original author increases. Increasing copyright scope is welfare improving up to
the point where the costs of expansion (increasing the cost of expression and administrative
costs) outweigh the benefits of increased incentives.
Figure 1 represents the intuition that there is some ideal or maximally efficient scope
of copyright. It represents welfare on the vertical axis and scope on the horizontal axis. The
welfare-scope curve is convex, such that there exists a point S*, the level of scope at which
welfare is maximized. An increase in scope from Sqo to S* will be welfare improving, but any
further increase (from S* to Sqp) has the reverse effect, as the difficulty of creating new works
while incorporating less and less of existing works begins to overwhelm the incentive effects.
Figure 1. Copyright scope as a function of welfare

Welfare

W*
Wq

S0

S qo

S*

S qp

S∞ Scope
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This representation of the welfare effects of copyright scope does not indicate
whether the current level of S is in fact greater than or less than S*. Views on this question
sharply diverge. Paul Goldstein neatly summarizes the opposing viewpoints in his description
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of “copyright optimism” versus “copyright pessimism.” Goldstein frames the debate as
follows:
On one side are lawyers who assert that copyright is rooted in natural justice, entitling
authors to every last penny that other people will pay to obtain copies of their works.
These are the copyright optimists: they view copyright’s cup of entitlement as always
half-full, only waiting to be filled still further. On the other side of the debate are
copyright pessimists, who see copyright's cup as half empty: they accept that
copyright owners should get some measure of control over copies as an incentive to
produce creative works, but they would like copyright to extend only so far as an
encroachment on the general freedom of everyone to write and say what they
please.97
Copyright pessimists and copyright optimists disagree about where the status quo (Sq)
is on the scope Copyright pessimists accept that intellectual property protection is beneficial
up to a point, but they argue that the current climate of broad exclusive rights has extended
copyright too far.98 The copyright pessimist view is represented on Figure 1 by the point (Sqp,
Wq), at which the curve is downward-sloping, with any increase in scope causing a reduction
in net welfare. In contrast, copyright optimists believe that greater protection of intellectual
property will encourage even further investment.99 The copyright optimist view is
represented on Figure 1 by the point (Sqo, Wq), at which the curve is upward-sloping with any
increase in scope improving net welfare. Note that both Sqp and Sqo are associated with
welfare level Wq, illustrating that it is possible to agree on the current benefits of the
copyright system but still disagree on whether copyright scope is too broad, or too narrow.
This simple model of the welfare effects of increasing copyright scope is consistent
with the common law intuition that the demands of sequential innovation are such that there
are diminishing returns to increasing the scope of copyright. In Campbell v. Acuff Rose, the

97 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM
GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX, 15 (1994).
98 See e.g. Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 8.
99 Goldstein himself falls into this camp; his recommendation is essentially to “extend rights into every
corner where consumers derive value from literary and artistic works.” Goldstein, supra note 97, at 236.
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Supreme Court identified an “… inherent tension in the need simultaneously to protect
copyrighted material and to allow others to build upon it.”100 The Court, borrowing from
Justice Story in Emerson v. Davies, also said that
“… in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which
in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature,
science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well
known and used before.”101
Stage 2: The effects of private ordering
Even assuming that all authors do in fact borrow from pre-existing works, i.e. every
first generation author is also a second generation author, the extent to which copyright
scope must be limited to accommodate this fact may be overstated in the simple model.
Menell and Scotchmer argue that the harm of too much protection may be “largely reversed
if firms can license to avoid conflicting property rights, rather than being forced into the
costly activity of avoiding them.”102 Although Menell and Scotchmer’s argument concentrates
on private ordering through the licensing (the market), efficient private ordering can also be
achieved through collectivization (the firm).
The prospect of efficient private ordering fundamentally challenges the simple
model’s assumption that increasing copyright scope is likely to increase the cost of
expression more than the incentive effect at some point. As Ronald Coase made clear, the
initial legal allocation of legal entitlements should not be confused with their ultimate
allocation by the market.103 For example, a court may give party A the right to pollute, or it
may give party B the right not to be polluted; either way the parties will trade their rights if
the other party values the right more. Theoretically, if the market for intellectual property

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).
Id. See also, Carey v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (K. B. 1803), per Lord Ellenborough.
102 Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 24.
103 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
100
101
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rights was perfectly efficient, any increase in the cost of expression caused by an expansion
of copyright scope should be at least off-set by the increased expected rewards.104
Subsequent authors seeking to build on an existing work may face higher costs, but those
costs should be off-set by their increased prospective reward.105 In a Coasian world, without
transaction costs or other market imperfections, there is no reason to assume that increasing
copyright scope ever reduces welfare.
Taken to an extreme, this view expands copyright optimism to general market
optimism to derive the conclusion that increasing copyright scope is always welfare
improving.106 Copyright optimism holds that increased control produces greater incentives
and hence greater production, and hence greater welfare; market optimism holds that rights
will be effectively redistributed through the market such that any subsequent producer who is
capable of adding value to an original work will be able to negotiate a license from the
copyright owner to do so. 107 The fact that first generation authors can extract rent from
second generation authors is not typically considered relevant from a welfare perspective, as
long as the subsequent user is still left with sufficient incentive to create. This “market
optimist” view of the welfare effects of copyright scope is depicted in Figure 2. The
asymptotic shape of the curve in Figure 2 captures the market optimist’s assumption that any
increase in copyright scope is welfare improving. Accordingly, in Figure 2, there is no S*,
because there is no level of S at which a further increase in scope would not be welfare

104 In theory, increasing the ratio of the copyright owner’s private benefit to the social benefit of a
work should perfect her incentives to produce. But that assumes that the process of internalization does not
reduce the overall size of the pie, as it surely must if taken to extremes. As Mark Lemley points out, “[i]n no
other area of the economy do we permit the full internalization of social benefits.” Lemley, Free Riding, supra
note 8, at 1032.
105 Menell and Scotchmer, supra note 16, at 23 – 24.
106 Julie Cohen labels proponents of similar views as “Cyber-cons.” I prefer the less pejorative term
“market optimist.” See, Cohen, supra note 8, at 464.
107 Bell, supra note 94, at 584.
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improving. Sq represents the status quo level of copyright scope and Wq its corresponding
welfare effect.
Figure 2. Copyright scope as a function of welfare: a market optimist’s view

Welfare

Wq

Sq

Scope
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The accuracy of this market optimist view of the welfare effects of copyright scope
depends on the efficiency of private ordering, both through the firm and the market. Adding
fuel to the fire of optimism, Robert Merges points to the success of collective rights
organizations such as ASCAP and certain patent pools, to argue that even if transactions
costs are initially high, market solutions will often emerge to reduce them.108 Merges
describes a process whereby repeat players in high transaction costs industries form collective
rights organizations to administer their rights, effectively exchanging their property
entitlements for liability rules.109 This suggests that even where copyright pessimists can

108 Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
109 Id.
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identify apparent market failures in the short run, in the long run the market itself will
address these problems.
While ASCAP has an impressive history, it is important to keep in mind its
limitations. One of ASCAP’s main functions is providing off-the-shelf licenses for the public
performance of musical works. From the perspective of its customers, ASCAP lowers search
and negotiation costs authors might otherwise encounter if they had to find and deal with
each author separately. From the perspective of it members, ASCAP also lowers negotiation
costs; in addition it lowers the cost of monitoring and enforcing authors rights, which would
be prohibitive on a case by case basis. However, ASCAP primarily deals in the world of
complete literal infringement, where rights are fairly certain. There is no reason to believe
that effective collective rights organizations would develop in scenarios of non-literal
infringement in the absence of high volume, relatively uniform transactions between repeat
players.110
The case for strong market optimism in copyright is limited by the nature of the
expansive nature of copyright itself. It is almost axiomatic in conventional law and
economics literature that the allocation of property rights increases certainty.111 For
copyright, the opposite may be true. As copyright scope expands, rights become increasingly
vague – not increasingly well defined. So it becomes increasingly difficult to know whose
rights you might be infringing with any given work.112 Harold Demsetz’s descriptive
proposition that property rights evolve in response to increased value of the underlying

110 Merges acknowledges this limitation, noting that “[o]nly repeated transactions among right holders
will give rise to the private institutions discussed in this Article. One-shot or sporadic interactions do not justify
investments in exchange institutions.” Id., at 1319.
111 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U CHI LEGAL F 207, 209 (1996). (When
property rights are poorly specified, it is hard to transact about them, and correspondingly hard to promote the
process of transaction that allocates resources to their highest valued uses.)
112 The same argument can be made with respect to copyright duration: the passage of time makes
tracing all the possible overlapping rights holders exponentially more complicated.
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object has clear application to copyright.113 The increasing importance of information has
been one of the primary rallying points of those who advocate extending the scope and
duration of copyright. Nonetheless, Brett Frischmann questions the normative gloss of the
Demsetzian thesis that property rights should extend in response to increased value.114 Where
the benefits of increased propertization are concentrated, the application of basic public
choice theory predicts that the level of propertization will exceed the Demsetzian equilibrium
and property rights will be extended beyond the point where the social benefit of
propertization outweighs the social cost.115 Frischmann questions the merits of everexpanding copyright for two fundamental reasons. First, not all externalities distort allocative
decision making by the producers of first generation products.116 Second, the market will
tend to undervalue information outputs that are used as infrastructure.117 I add a third
observation that goes beyond externalities. Another reason to question the normative gloss
of the Demsetzian thesis is that an expansion in copyright scope may render a superficially
welfare improving outcome, but if the change increases the administrative costs of the
copyright system, or the uncertainty costs borne by second generation authors, the change
may in fact be welfare reducing.
A potential cause of doctrinal inefficiency that deserves greater attention is the
implications of strategic behavior. Market optimists who rely on the extensive reallocation of
permissions through licensing must take into account the increased significance of strategic
behavior encouraged by increased market participation. Obviously, if a change in copyright
scope increases a second generation authors need to “go to the market” to attain copyright
See Frischmann, The Demsetzian Trend in Copyright, (working paper).
Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. (Externalities are ubiquitous in society, and in a wide variety of contexts, externalities are
simultaneously valuable to society and yet irrelevant to investment decisions, or more generally, to resource
allocation by the market.) See also David D. Haddock, Irrelevant Externality Angst,[cite].
117 Frischmann, Id.
113
114
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permissions, she clearly faces increased transaction costs. But, in addition, she must also
contend with the risk that first generation author’s will strategically use their hold-up power
to extract the highest license fees possible. So, relying exclusively on market mechanisms of
exchange creates the danger that strategic exploitation of the market system can reduce
aggregate welfare.
Another potential cause of doctrinal inefficiency that deserves greater attention is the
possibility that private ordering may reduce the diversity of information production or result
in overly-centralized decision making architectures.118 Increases in copyright scope may
reduce diversity by increasing the concentration of information production, or by
concentrating too much decision making power in the hands of first generation authors.119
For example, a recent Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision has held that any digital music
sampling, no matter how brief, nor how unrecognizable, requires a license from the
copyright owner.120 Under this interpretation of the law,121 artists who use a lot of music
samples are likely to gravitate towards large labels that offer them a significant catalog of
primary material, where they can be sure of attaining the required permissions on reasonable
terms. Even if this does not reduce the production of music genres such as hip-hop, it may
tend to centralize production under the roof of the large recording studios that already
dominate the industry, and thus potentially reduce diversity, which is part of consumer
welfare.122

See Wu, supra note 29.
Id.
120 Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir., 2005) As the court so eloquently
stated, “Get a license or do not sample.”
121 For a thoughtful critique of the Bridgeport decision, see Sang Lee, De Minimis Taking, Digital Sampling,
and Copyright Infringement: A New Dissonance in Production, NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
118
119

122
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Stage 3: Reconciling the simple model with private ordering
We are left with a mixed picture. We should expect private ordering through
licensing and the formation of firms to significantly reduce the negative welfare
consequences of increasing copyright scope, but only up to a point. Figure 3 shows the
welfare effects of copyright scope as initially depicted in Figure 1 (represented as a dashed
line) but revised to take account of the mitigating effects of private ordering through both
the firm and the market (represented by the solid line). As illustrated, if we reject a strong
version of market optimism, the negative effects of an increase in copyright scope can be
mitigated by private ordering, but not entirely erased. At the extreme level of copyright
scope (S∞), the welfare effect of copyright falls to zero. In this scenario any similarity
constitutes copyright infringement, such that even the mere discussion of the Coase
Theorem would require a license from its original author. Obviously, S∞ does not represent
any level of copyright scope that is likely to occur, even if copyright was rewritten according
to the desires of copyright interests such as the RIAA and the MPAA.
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Figure 3. The welfare effects of copyright scope given private ordering
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As Figure 3 illustrates, private ordering through both the market and the firm
increases the level of copyright scope at which welfare is maximized (from S* to S**), but it
does not change the fundamental relationship between copyright scope and welfare. The
curve depicting the relationship is still convex; there is still a point, S**, at which any increase
in copyright scope will reduce welfare below its maximum, W**.
Stage 4: Recognizing indeterminacy
None of this answers the question of whether the current level of copyright scope is
more or less than S**. Empirical research on the efficiency of licensing and the consolidation
of information production into firms has the potential to shed some light on this question,
but it is unlikely to ever be conclusive. Different views of the benefits or detriments of a
further extension of copyright scope can be attributed either to different assessments of the
relationship between copyright scope and welfare, or merely to different assessments of the
status quo, or different views regarding the effectiveness of market reallocation. A copyright
38
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pessimist is likely to view the relationship as positively skewed, such that most of the benefits
of copyright protection come from fairly low levels of protection. In contrast, a copyright
optimist is likely to view the relationship as negatively skewed, such that it is not until
copyright scope is very broad that the maximum benefits of copyright are seen. Figure 4
illustrates three possible relationships between welfare and copyright scope, drawn from the
perspectives ranging from less to more optimistic (pessimist (CP), neutral (CN) and optimist
(CO)).
Figure 4. Multiple possible relationships
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Consider the move from S1 to S2, where S1 represents the current level of copyright
scope and S2 represents a proposed increase. The shift from S1 to S2 is welfare negative on
the CP curve because welfare declines from W1 to W3. On the CN curve, the shift from S1 to
S2 is welfare neutral, although a move from S1 to any point between S1 and S2 would be
welfare enhancing. On the CO curve, the shift from S1 to S2 is welfare improving because
welfare increases from W2 to W1.
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The three curves in Figure 4 represent three different sets of assumptions about the
relationship between copyright scope and welfare and varying degrees of optimism about the
effect of an increase in copyright scope. However, they could equally represent the varying
effects of copyright across three different industries. Returning to the earlier example of the
Bridgeport decision, a blanket prohibition on unlicensed digital sampling is likely to modestly
increase the incentives for music production in general, but it would also significantly raise
the costs of producing certain types of music, such as hip-hop. Alternatively, it may be the
case that folk musicians with a tradition of reinterpreting past works have lower fixed costs,
require lower monetary rewards, but experience higher intrinsic rewards from production
than pop singers in the mold of Britney Spears. Given those assumptions, folk singers would
be best served by fairly low levels of copyright scope and are potentially adversely affected by
even small increases in costs and uncertainty associated with higher levels of scope.
This leads to another significant consideration: even if it is established that an
increase in copyright scope would do more harm than good in one industry, we have no
present basis on which to generalize that finding to other industries.123 In Figure 4 if we view
CO, CN and CP, not as different views of the scope-welfare relationship in a given market,
but rather as the scope-welfare relationship in three different markets, it is clear that
increasing copyright scope might simultaneously increase welfare in relation to one sector of
the economy, while reducing it in another.
The application of general standards to specific situations is an inherent part of the
process of common law adjudication.124 Those who advocate going one step further and
Dan Burk and Mark Lemley discuss a similar problem with respect to industry variation in patent
law. Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1578 (2003) (Finding
that economic evidence, patent doctrine, and legal theory, all vary by industry).
124 A good example in copyright is the Judge Posner’s modification of the joint authorship test in
Gaiman v MacFarlane to accommodate the creative processes of the comic book industry. Gaiman v. McFarlane,
360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004).
123
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tailoring specific doctrines to the perceived need for incentives in particular industries must
take into account at least five potential hazards. First, industries are constantly evolving, thus
industry definitions are inherently fluid and resist legal definition. Technological and social
changes are continually reshaping the organization of industrial behavior and threatening to
make today’s well drawn classification into tomorrow’s anachronism. For example, computer
programming might once have been entirely differentiable from movie making, but the rise
of animated films and big budget computer games has entirely blurred that distinction.
Second, express reliance on industry status gives litigants significant incentives to
push the boundaries of whatever industry definition is used. The gradual erosion of limits on
patentable subject matter illustrates the difficulty of maintaining industry based distinctions
once they come under sustained attack. Third, intra-industry variation may be just as
significant as inter-industry variation depending on the level of generality of the industry
definition used. Fourth, inter-industry effects are likely to be ambiguous. A change in the law
tailored to one industry may have flow on consequences for other industries. Fifth, industry
tailoring may have negative effects on the overall political economy of copyright law.125
Tailoring rules to particular industries concentrates their interests in lobbying for even more
particularized benefits from Congress. None of this suggests that industry tailoring is never
appropriate, just that its advocates need to carefully consider its feasibility in general and
whether they have hit upon the most efficient doctrinal lever in particular.
As discussed in detail in Part III, an industry tailoring approach to the fair use
doctrine is particularly unworkable for all these reasons. In contrast, a situational approach to
fair use is to be preferred because it makes more sense for courts to examine the nature of

125

See note __ infra and accompanying text.
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the defendant’s activity, rather than her status or affiliation. The key inquiry in this
situational approach is whether the market should be presumed to be working, or not.126
How then should we assess whether doctrines should be amended to account for
perceived needs to alter scope, according to either industry-specific or more general
demands? The next two subsections develop the practical application of this theory.
D. The importance of doctrinal efficiency
Existing scholarship questioning the scope of tends to focus on either the public
good nature of information or the positive externalities which result from information
production,127 whereas this article highlights the relationship between copyright scope and
doctrinal efficiency. The existing literature is rife with assertions that copyright is either
unnecessary or too broad in specific applications, and that various doctrinal levers should be
employed to remedy those excesses. 128 However, even if we accept that copyright doctrines
should be used as levers to more perfectly tailor copyright scope, we still need a mechanism
to select which lever to pull and to understand when the costs of such tailoring are likely to
exceed the benefits.
In evaluating specific doctrinal recommendations, we need to assess both the effect
on copyright scope in general and the specific costs and benefits of the doctrinal formulation
in particular. From this perspective, it is simplistic to assume that all possible compositions
of copyright scope have the same effect on the author’s expected reward, the author’s cost of
expression and the administrative costs of the copyright system.129 As discussed in the
previous subsection, the traditional economic analysis of copyright can be usefully reframed
126

See e.g. Frischmann, Infrastructure, supra note 8.
See, supra note 10.
129 This simplifying assumption is perfectly reasonable in the context of Landes and Posner’s original
work which focused on the economic efficiency of the copyright system as a whole. See Landes and Posner,
supra note 1, at 325.
127
128
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as an inquiry into the optimum level of copyright scope, as opposed to copyright protection
(which includes both scope and duration). Although focusing on scope is in many ways an
improvement on the traditional model, it remains compositionally indeterminate. Just as
copyright protection is composed of both scope and duration; copyright scope itself
represents the combined effects of numerous copyright doctrines, such as the ideaexpression distinction, the requirement for substantial similarity and the doctrine of fair
use.130 Consequently, any assessment of the optimum level of scope will also be doctrinally
indeterminate, as it too could be achieved through a theoretically infinite number of
combinations of its various components.131
The compositional indeterminacy of copyright scope means that economic analysis
of copyright doctrines must consider both the optimal level of copyright scope and the
efficiency of individual doctrines. Even if one regards economic efficiency as the sole
motivation for copyright doctrines,132 it is nonetheless apparent that copyright doctrines are
only approximations for the efficiency concerns embedded within the law. Furthermore, the
flexibility of individual doctrines is limited by the need to establish tests that are capable of
external observation and judicial application.
There is no easy solution to interdependence of optimum copyright scope and
optimum doctrinal composition, but it is clear that some comparison of doctrinal efficiency
effects with the possible welfare gains of changing the level of copyright scope is necessary.
One measure of the efficiency of individual doctrines is the disparity between the positive
incentive effects of marginal increases in copyright scope and the associated increased costs
See supra note 35 regarding other possible determinants of scope.
Landes and Posner hint at the problem of compositional indeterminacy, but they do not pursue its
conclusions beyond noting that “[t]he more the cost of expression rises as [Z] increases… the lower will be the
optimal degree of copyright protection.” Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 344.
132 For a contrary point of view see, Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287
(1988). See also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1535 (2005).
130
131
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to potential second generation authors. Put simply, the efficiency of an individual copyright
doctrine is determined by the extent that a change in scope it benefits first generation authors
more than its costs second generation authors.
Let α represent the difference between two levels of copyright scope. Assume that
expanding a particular doctrine (from D1 and D2) will result in α increase in copyright scope.
For example, a court could replace an objective audience based test of substantial similarity
with a more inclusive test that merely required that the defendant’s work would remind a
substantial section of the public of the work of the plaintiff.133 Even if preliminary economic
analysis suggested expanding scope α degrees would result in a welfare improvement β, the
desirability of the specific doctrinal change from D1 and D2 still depends on a comparison of
the efficiency of the old doctrine compared to the new one.
β measures the move along the existing scope-welfare curve, but this is not
necessarily the only change which occurs when copyright scope is increased. Expanding a
particular doctrine from D1 to D2 may also change the function of scope-welfare relationship,
resulting in a separate welfare effect, γ. γ represents the welfare effect of the doctrinal shift, a
function of the marginal efficiency of the doctrine in question. If γ ≥ β, then the suggested
doctrinal change is unwarranted. How do β and γ differ? β is the predicted welfare effect of a
change in copyright scope, it assumes that the doctrinal shift used to bring about that change
has no effect on the welfare-scope relationship. In contrast, γ measures the welfare effect of
changing the composition of copyright scope. Each combination of doctrines used to
implement a change in scope may generate a different value for γ.

133 Compare the test for substantial similarity in Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein
Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2003) with the rather vague standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit
in right of publicity cases. See White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253 (9th
Cir. 1992) (Advertisement featuring robot in blond wig held appropriate Vanna White’ identity).
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The intuition behind this proposition is that legal doctrines do not simply gravitate
towards efficiency in the abstract, they tend to “stick” at formulations that prove to be stable,
workable and administrable.134 As such, there may be significant uncertainty costs in
attempting to precisely engineer doctrinal settings to manipulate the level of copyright scope.
Furthermore, these costs are likely to vary depending on the doctrinal instrument chosen.
Those who advocate the use of a particular doctrinal lever to control copyright scope must
not only establish that an adjustment in scope is justified, but also that the lever they have
chosen to pull is the right one. Returning to the previous example, rather than changing the
requirement for substantial similarity, it might more efficient to adjust one of the other
variables of copyright scope, such as the fair use doctrine.
It is important to understand the potential causes of doctrinal inefficiency and why
the efficiency of doctrine is likely to vary. If a change in the law costs the average second
generation author $100 more to create a work, that does not necessarily mean that the
average first generation author receives $100 more copyright incentive. There is no reason to
assume that the reward effect of any given change in the law will simply be the mirror image
of the effect on the cost of expression.
First, transaction costs create an obvious asymmetry between the first generation
author’s reward and the second generation author’s cost of expression. Second, even in the
absence of transaction costs, second generation authors face the choice to license or evade
the rights of the first generation author, and that choice complicates the relationship between
author’s expected rewards and their cost of expression for any given legal change. If the
second generation author licenses, the first generation author profits directly; but if the

134

At least until they are subject to some countervailing force for change.
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second generation author evades through increased product differentiation, the first
generation author only profits indirectly through a lessening of direct competition.135
An economic analysis of copyright doctrine should not just consider the elusive
question of the optimal level of copyright protection or even the optimal degree of copyright
scope. It must also consider the how different doctrinal compositions of copyright might affect
authors’ expected rewards, expected cost of expression and administrative costs for any given
level of copyright scope. To be sure, precisely measuring doctrinal efficiency is problematic,
but the experience of judges administering the common law is likely to give them at least a
broad intuitive grasp of the trade-offs involved.
Indeed, improving the efficiency of copyright doctrines without reference to
optimum copyright scope may be justified in some cases. If the resulting changes in scope are
thought to be small, the welfare benefits of improving doctrinal efficiency will probably
exceed the possible costs of moving scope in the wrong direction. For example, the
application of the fair use doctrine could be greatly improved through a codification of
certain safe-harbors already recognized in the common law. Doctrinal rules are least efficient
when they increase transaction costs and uncertainty, or where they impede market solutions.
Mitigating this inefficiency is a feasible use of law and economics, probably more feasible
than finding the optimal level of copyright protection or even the optimal level of copyright
scope.

135 Alternatively, the second generation author’s evasion could be conceived in terms of an increased
entry cost to an undifferentiated market, as opposed to increased product differentiation. Either way the first
author profits indirectly through a reduction of competition. See supra note 37.
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E. Applying the copyright scope framework
The forgoing discussion can be reduced to four conclusions, three of which in turn
provide useful metrics to assess a variety of specific doctrinal recommendations in copyright
law.
First, it can be said with a high degree of confidence that a level of copyright scope
that approaches either zero or infinity will be sub-optimal.136 By itself this does not serve as a
useful benchmark, but it is an important foundational point. The normative implications of
this conclusion depend on one’s own assessment of where the current scope of copyright lies
along that spectrum. The current scope of copyright is clearly less than S∞, but whether it is
more or less than S* remains an open question. Copyright scope today is undoubtedly high
compared to any other period of history.137On the other hand, although copyright scope has
undoubtedly increased over time, less robust application of the idea expression distinction,
lower thresholds of substantial similarity, and more restrictive interpretations of fair use
doctrine are easy to imagine.138
Also, the normative implications of the uncertainty of the status quo in relation to the
optimum level of copyright scope are murky. Copyright scope is often affected by external
events. For example, the increasing use of personal computers has increased copyright scope
because the use of a copyrighted digital work also necessitates copying that work into a
computer’s random access memory.139 However, computer technology has also reduced the

136 Clearly, this is by no means the first article on copyright to reach this conclusion, nor is it likely to
be the last. See e.g. Lessig, Intellectual Property and Code, supra note 8, at 638); Cohen, supra note 8, at 514.
137 Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 8, at 7 – 8, 141 – 44.
138 For example, current tests as to substantial similarity are arguably more stringent than in the past.
See Nimmer’s discussion of Tufenkian Import/Export and the rehabilitation of the Second Circuit’s “total concept
and feel” test for substantial similarity. 4-13 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03; Tufenkian Import/Export
Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2003).
139 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).
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effective scope of copyright by drastically decreasing the cost of copying.140 Certainly, there is
good case for advising caution in relation to any further deliberate expansion in copyright
scope, but that leaves open the question of whether copyright should be reengineered in
response to external changes that appear to have caused a significant shift in copyright scope
to maintain the current level of copyright scope. We should be skeptical of our power to
perfectly engineer copyright scope.
The second conclusion is that the net welfare effects of a change in copyright scope
are dependant on the efficiency of private ordering. The more efficiently the market
reallocates rights through licensing or the consolidation of production into firms, the higher
the optimum level of copyright scope will be. If the scope-welfare function is convex, not
only is the efficiency of private ordering likely to vary generally, but the degree of efficiency
required to justify an increase in copyright scope on welfare grounds increases with the level
of copyright scope. Thus the higher the existing level of copyright scope is, the more
perfectly efficient private ordering must be to sustain yet further increases.
The third conclusion is that the compositional indeterminacy of copyright scope (and
copyright protection more generally) means that economic analysis of copyright doctrines
must consider both the optimal level of copyright scope and the effect of different doctrinal
compositions of copyright scope. Doctrinal recommendations that focus on optimizing the
scope of copyright in the abstract but do not account for the effect of a proposed doctrinal
change on transaction costs or uncertainty are necessarily incomplete.
The fourth conclusion that can be drawn from the forgoing models of the welfare
effects of copyright scope is that determining the net welfare effects of any given change in
copyright doctrine is extremely difficult. Even if a cost-benefit analysis of the welfare effects
140

Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, supra note 1, at 84.
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of a change in copyright scope with respect to one particular group was clear, the net welfare
effect across all affected groups remains uncertain. It would be difficult to say prospectively
whether a change in the law that made Hollywood blockbusters less profitable but expanded
the freedom of independent film makers was a net positive, especially because each provides
the infrastructure for the other in some fashion. Empirical evidence of the effect of changes
in copyright scope has the potential to further clarify the nature of the welfare-scope
relationship, but subject to both inter- and intra-industry variation.
The welfare-scope relationship is both complicated and subject to substantial
variation, both within and between industries. Doctrinal recommendations which simply
assume that the welfare effects of a change in copyright scope are easily ascertainable are far
too simplistic. Even where data is available, it will be open to competing explanations and
extrapolations. Furthermore, advocates of industry focused tailoring solutions must consider
whether intra-industry variation might not be just as significant as the inter-industry variation
they seek to design policy around.
In summary, the insights offered by the analysis of copyright scope in this article go
well beyond the mere assertion that infinite copyright is undesirable (although that is an
important starting point). In particular, the forgoing analysis has established the following:
(1)

The efficiency of private ordering is the key determinant of the ideal level of
copyright scope.

(2)

The welfare-scope relationship is both complicated and subject to substantial
variation, both within and between industries.

(3)

Doctrinal recommendations that focus on optimizing the scope of copyright
in the abstract but do not account for the effect of a doctrinal change on
transaction costs or uncertainty are necessarily incomplete.
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The next part applies these conclusions as metrics for assessing the primary law and
economics approaches to copyright’s fair use doctrine.

PART III – APPLICATION TO FAIR USE
This part builds on the previous sections of the article by assessing the predominant
law and economics approaches to copyright’s fair use doctrine in light of the conclusions
above. The conclusions from the previous part can be restated as metrics or benchmarks for
analysis as follows:141
(1)

Does the recommended application take account of the role of private
ordering in determining the ideal scope of copyright?

(2)

Is the recommended application doctrinally efficiency?

(3)

Is the recommended application feasible in light of the expectation that there
will be substantial variation, both within and between industries, in the
welfare-scope relationship?

By applying these metrics for assessing doctrinal proposals, this article illustrates how
the gap between the traditional law and economics of copyright and specific doctrinal
analysis can be bridged. The development and application of these metrics does not
definitively determine which doctrinal proposals are either efficient or normatively desirable,
but it makes a contribution by filtering out some ill-conceived recommendations, and by
identifying areas for improvement in others. The analysis that follows is devoted to the
traditionally “troublesome” doctrine of fair use,142 but the metrics developed in this article
can be applied to wide range of doctrinal recommendations in copyright.

141
142

The metrics have been reordered to suit the application that follows.
See, Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2nd Cir. 1939).
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The two primary law and economics contributions to the fair use doctrine, the
market failure test and the application of a cost-benefit analysis present a puzzling
contradiction. Resting on an initial presumption of efficient private ordering, the market
failure approach places a heavy burden on defendants to establish fair use. 143144 In contrast,
the cost-benefit approach manifests a deep pessimism in the capacity of market institutions
to provide the kind of flexibility that the users of copyrighted works require, and tilts the
scales heavily in favor of fair use.145 These approaches share a common foundation in law
and economics, and yet they reach very different conclusions as to how judges should apply
the fair use doctrine.
The following subsections outline each theory, then assess each of the theories
against the metrics listed above.
A. Law and economics theories of fair use
1. Fair Use as Market Failure
Since it was first articulated by Wendy Gordon over twenty years ago,146 the concept
of fair use as market failure has been controversial,147 and arguably misunderstood.148

143 Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and
Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1653-54 (1982) (hereafter, Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure).
144 Id. at 1614. (Gordon proposed a three part test as follows: “Fair use should be awarded to the
defendant in a copyright infringement action when (1) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to
defendant is socially desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives
of the plaintiff copyright owner.”)
145 Variations of a cost-benefit analysis of fair use have been proposed by a number of scholars, most
comprehensively by William Fisher and Glynn Lunney. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing The Fair Use
Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661 (1988); Glynn S. Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 975 (2002). See notes __ – __ infra and accompanying text.
146 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 143, at 1653-54.
147 See for example: Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market
Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 539 (2003); Lunney, Sony Revisited, supra note 145; Robert P. Merges, The
End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the “Newtonian” World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
115, 130-34 (1997); and Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining The Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright
Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997).
148 According to Gordon herself. See Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual Property: A Response To
Professor Lunney. 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031 (hereafter, Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual Property). See also
Merges, The End of Friction, supra note 147, at 130.
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Nonetheless its influence is undeniable.149 The essential logic of the fair use as market failure
paradigm is that strong property rights facilitate an efficient market in the exploitation of
creative works, but that on occasions where that market fails, exceptions to strong property
rights in the form of fair use have to be made.150
Applications of Gordon’s market failure framework have largely concentrated on the
role of transaction costs151 in justifying fair use.152 However, it is important to note at the
outset that Gordon’s initial formulation also addressed other potential causes of market
failure, including externalities and “non-economic motivations.”153 Gordon’s original test for
applying fair use required the defendant to establish three things: (1) the presence of market
failure; (2) the social desirability of allowing the defendant’s unauthorized use to continue;
and (3) that finding fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of the
copyright owner.154
There have been many attempts to apply fair use as market failure to extrapolate an
efficient application of the fair use doctrine in particular situations. For example, Landes and
Posner reframe the fair use status of parody in terms of a failure in the market for permission
to criticize in the form of a derivative work.155 A failure of the market for permission to
Gordon’s Fair Use as Market Failure has been cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984) (Justice Blackmun, in dissent);
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (O’Connor, J., per curium); and
by the Second Circuit in Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 1998); by the
Seventh Circuit in Ty, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002); by the Ninth Circuit in Fisher v.
Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) and Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227
F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000); In addition, Gordon’s Fair Use as Market Failure was clearly influential in the
Second Circuit’s decision in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
150 See, Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in
Copyright, 21 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 305, 307 (1993) (noting that deviations from a presumption
against fair use “must be pleaded with special facts, and convincingly.”)
151 The term ‘transaction cost’ broadly refers to any cost incurred in relation to an economic exchange.
See Tirole, supra note 38, at 29.
152 See note __ infra.
153 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 143.
154 Id., at 6014. Note that Gordon no longer holds to the third element of her proposed test. See
Gordon, Intellectual Property and Market Failure, supra note 148, at 1034-1035.
155 Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 359 – 360.
149
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parody appears inevitable, since it would be unrealistic to expect authors to voluntarily allow
themselves to be criticized.156 Although this is a convincing explanation, it fails to identify
exactly why the author’s subjective value in not being ridiculed should not be fully
represented.157 As Alfred Yen argues, the idea that parody represents a market failure rests on
a value judgment that the author’s anti-dissemination motives should be given less respect
than other preferences.158 As a matter of copyright doctrine, this is fairly easy to explain.
Copyright does not exist for the benefit of individual authors, but rather for the promotion
of the progress of science and the useful arts.159 Given that rationale, a preference for
dissemination seems obvious. But, from an abstract utility maximizing perspective, it is hard
to see why we shouldn’t be completely neutral about an author’s desire to suppress
information. In which case, anti-dissemination motives are not a source of market failure.160
Landes and Posner also regard quotation and reference in the service of review and
criticism more generally as justified under a market failure approach.161 The authors argue
that if reviews depended on consent, they would lose credibility with the public and therefore
be less valuable to both authors and the public.162 Consequently, the benefits of a no-consent
rule to authors as a class outweigh the individual interests of those authors who get bad
reviews. From a game theory perspective, this can be framed as a simple coordination
problem. However, applying the logic of Merges’ Contracting Into Liability Rules to the problem

156 As the Supreme Court notes in Campbell, “People ask for criticism, but they only want praise.”
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (U.S. 1994) (quoting from S. Maugham, Of Human Bondage
241 (Penguin ed. 1992))
157 See, Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won't Sell: Parody, Fair Use and Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U.
COLO. L. REV. 79 (1991).
158 Id.
159 U.S. Const. Art 8.
160 Yen, supra note 157, at 79.
161 Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 358.
162 Id., at 359.
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of reviews,163 one might ask why we should not simply rely on the emergence of market
mechanisms to overcome such problems. If authors as a class really benefit from reviews,
they should find some contractual mechanism to enable them to pre-commit to allowing
reviews.164
Furthermore, in response to the recent extension of duration,165 a number of authors
have suggested that courts should adjust the scope of copyright protection to account for the
passage of time by expressly considering time as a factor in fair use analysis.166 Joseph Liu
argues that as a work becomes older, the ability of the author to prevent re-use, critique,
transform, and adaptation of that work should diminish, i.e. “fair use should be greater for
Mickey Mouse than for Harry Potter.”167 Richard Posner and William Patry present a
proposal that is similar, but more clearly framed within the market failure paradigm. They
suggest that the problem of obtaining licenses to reproduce old works of limited commercial
value also merits fair use.168
2. A Cost-Benefit Approach to Fair Use
In the course of his epic reconstruction of the fair use doctrine, William Fisher
proposes an altogether different law and economics based approach to resolving fair use
cases. Fisher suggests that fair use cases should be determined through a detailed
examination of the costs and benefits of the incentives and impositions resulting from

163
164

text.

See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
Reasons why this may not be the case are addressed below, see notes __ – __ and accompanying

See, Copyright Term Extension Act (1998).
Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409 (2002)
167 Id. at 410. See also, Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775 (2003) (Fewer
unauthorized uses should be fair uses in the first years or decades of a copyright term, and more and more
unauthorized uses should be deemed fair as a work grows older).
168 Richard Posner and William Patry, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 1639 (2004).
165
166
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competing uses of any given work.169 The “cost” of allowing fair use is the notional reduction
in the copyright owner’s incentives compared to what they might have been, had fair use not
been allowed. The copyright owner’s potential incentives in this calculation include any
licensing revenue she could have extracted from the defendant or any similarly situated
persons.170 The “benefit” of allowing fair use is that the defendant is neither denied the use
of the work, nor is she forced to pay the copyright owner for that use. Again, this includes
not just the actual defendant, but also all similarly situated potential defendants.171
The idea of resolving fair use decisions through a cost-benefit analysis is simple to
state, but difficult to apply. Under Fisher’s approach, a judge would have to catalog every
conceivable type of use of a work, ranging from reprints to action figures and beyond, then
to determine the value of each potential use, rank them, and weigh them against the range of
costs to the current and other future possible defendants.172
Glynn Lunney offers another version of a cost benefit analysis for fair use.173 Lunney
urges courts to regard the four statutory factors as historically dated “proxies for the balance
of competing public interests” and adopt a more general cost-benefit approach to the fair
use.174 Similar to Fisher, Lunney argues that, “[i]n an ideal world with perfect information,
courts could resolve the fair use issue by determining precisely the social value of additional
authorship resulting from prohibiting a use and then comparing that value to the social value

169 Fisher, supra note 145. A cost-benefit analysis is also the second limb of Gordon’s test, once the
initial screen of market failure has been satisfied. Although Gordon’s formulation is slightly different, in that she
would determine whether allowing fair use was socially beneficial by asking whether “when the “market failure”
were cured, the price that the owner would demand is lower than the price that the user would offer.” Gordon,
Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 143, at 1614.
170 Fisher, supra note 145, at 1699.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Lunney, Sony Revisited, supra note 145, at 1023.
174 Id., at 998.
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of allowing the use to continue.”175 What is striking about this formulation is that it suggests
that the ideal resolution of fair use cases rests literally on a case-by-case analysis. Whether
this is what Lunney actually intended, or merely a paradigmatic extrapolation, is unclear.
Accordingly, the application of the metrics that follows considers a cost-benefit analysis
applied on a purely case by case level, a highly specified level that required a new cost-benefit
analysis for all but the narrowest of factual classes, and a cost-benefit analysis applied at a
much broader industry level.
B. Applying the doctrinal metrics to fair use as market failure
1. The efficiency of private ordering
The first test of any law and economics based doctrinal recommendation should be
whether it takes account of the relationship between the ideal level of copyright scope and
the efficiency of private ordering. Prima facie, the market failure approach to fair use would
seem to pass this test with flying colors, but a more detailed analysis suggests some grounds
for qualification. Although the market failure test for fair use is appropriately focused on the
central question of whether the market is working or not, the mechanics of the test are
loaded significantly in favor of false positives, i.e., of concluding that the market is working
when in fact it is not.176 In particular, the requirement that the defendant prove the existence
of market failure as a prerequisite for a finding of fair use177 tilts this apparently neutral
framework decidedly in favor of the copyright owner.
The allocation of the burden of proof in fair use cases is extremely important because
of the difficulty of actually proving that a market is or is not working. The Supreme Court’s
Sony decision illustrates an evidentiary stalemate typical of fair cases: the movie studios were
175
176

desirability.
177

Id.
See Wu, supra note 29 on the distinction between Type I and Type II errors and their comparative
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 143, at 1614.
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unable to establish that time-shifting actually resulted in an adverse market effect, but nor
could Sony establish that such an effect would not occur in the future. Ultimately, the case
turned on the majority’s presumption that non-commercial uses were fair uses.

178

Transaction costs, externalities and “non-market motivations” are always present to some
degree in real world markets. Consequently, merely identifying the existence of one or more
potential causes of market failure will never be sufficient; the defendant (or the plaintiff)
must establish that these market imperfections are of a sufficient degree to constitute a
market failure.
The presence of transaction costs that exceed the potential gains from trade between
a copyright owner and a subsequent user is probably the most common rationalization for
findings of fair use.179 The term ‘transaction cost’ broadly refers to any cost incurred in
relation to an economic exchange.180 At a minimum, participants in the market for copyright
permissions must (1) determine what permissions they require (2) locate all potential rights
holders, and (3) negotiate with those rights holders over prices and terms. Additionally, there
may also be costs to maintaining and enforcing agreements.181 Transaction costs are
significant because they may prevent otherwise efficient reallocation from taking place.182 For
example, even though library users might be willing to pay a small price for permission to
photocopy from text books and journal articles, they are probably unwilling to also bear the
costs of contacting the relevant copyright owners and negotiating a license. If transaction

178 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984) (“If the Betamax
were used to make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair.
The contrary presumption is appropriate here, however, because the District Court's findings plainly establish
that time-shifting for private home use must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.”)
179 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 143.
180 See, supra note 151.
181 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 143.
182 Id. (When the transaction costs outweigh the net benefits that the parties would otherwise
anticipate from a transfer, then the presence of the transaction costs may block an otherwise desirable shift in
resource use.)
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costs exceed the potential gains from trade, the market will fail to allocate resources
efficiently.183
Although identifying potential sources of transaction costs is relatively easy, proving
that they are, and will remain, so significant that the market has failed, is considerably more
difficult. Indeed, a number of authors stress that exceptions to copyright based on
transaction costs should be granted only sparingly.184 As Rob Merges explains, one reason is
that the presence of transaction costs creates an incentive for innovative market solutions
that reduce transaction costs in the long term, without the disadvantages of judicial or
government regulation.185 Merges’ analysis suggests that even the identification of apparent
market failures in the short run does not merit limiting the scope of the copyright owner’s
rights because, in the long run, the market itself will address these problems.186 A second
reason often given as to why courts should not intervene in the face of transaction costs is
that advances in technology may enable more efficient private ordering, by reducing
transactional barriers and enabling copyright owners to control their works more effectively
through the use of sophisticated permissions systems and digital rights management.187 Some
scholars have even predicted that these technological developments may obviate the need for
the fair use doctrine entirely.188 For both these reasons, transaction cost stories are easy to

Note that with respect to copyright, the potential gains from trade are normally equal to the user’s
valuation of the right to make a copy, because the good in question is nonrivalrous. Consequently, where
transaction costs are greater than a user’s valuation, the market will fail to allocate resources efficiently. In such
cases, the would-be second user can either heed the exclusive rights of the copyright owner and forego the
activity, or she can ignore those rights and reap the benefit of that use. Where transaction costs make licensing
impossible, the copyright owner is neither benefited nor disadvantaged by unauthorized uses of a work; no
matter what choice the would-be second user makes, the copyright owner gets nothing and loses nothing.
184 Merges, supra note 108. See also, Landes and Posner, supra note 1, at 358.
185 Merges, Id.
186 See, Id.
187 See, Goldstein, supra note 82, at 223-24. See Cohen, supra note 8, for an extensive discussion of this
school of thought and its limitations.
188 See, e.g. Bell, supra note 94.
183
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tell but hard to prove, thus elevating the significance of the market failure test’s allocation of
the burden of proof.
The allocation of the burden of proof onto the defendant is likely to be even more
loaded against finding fair use where the defendant’s case relies not on transaction costs, but
on less tangible causes of market failure such as externalities or non-economic motivations.
There is a significant literature criticizing narrow applications of the market failure approach
for their failure to account for externalities, which does not need to be repeated here.189 The
problem for a defendant seeking to prove market failure (or for a plaintiff seeking to
disprove it) is that the market failure approach itself gives little guidance as to what degree of
positive externalities or non-economic motivations might justify the application of fair use.
For example, it might be true that billionaire industrialist Howard Hughes bought up all the
copyrights in magazine stories chronicling his life in an attempt to suppress that
information.190 But without a mechanism to value Hughes’ interests differently to his own
subjective valuation (as measured by his willingness to pay, and presumed unwillingness to
license), simply describing the copyright owner’s motives as “non-economic” is not
analytically useful by itself.191
Labeling someone as “irrational” does not amount to a systemic analysis of the
efficiency of private ordering. From the perspective of law and economics, a better approach
to assessing the efficiency of private ordering in such cases would be to rely on the insights
of the literature on game theory or behavioral economics to identify scenarios where the
market is likely to fail.192 Perhaps the most prominent application of game theory analysis in

189 Loren, supra note 147, Lemley, Economics, supra note 8 Cohen, supra note 8; Frischmann,
Infrastructure, supra note 8.
190 Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311-312 (2d Cir., 1966).
191 This is similar to Yen’s point about parody. See Yen supra note 157.
192 __
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the intellectual property literature is Michael Heller’s “anticommons theory.”193 Heller and
Rebecca Eisenberg have suggested that unlike the familiar “tragedy of the commons” which
leads to over-use of a scarce resource,194 in some circumstances fragmented ownership of
upstream rights can lead to an anticommons, the under-use of a valuable resource.195 In the
biotechnology context, Heller and Eisenberg argue that the availability of patents on gene
fragments threatens to create an anticommons, thus stifling the process of drug discovery.196
As the authors explain, the increasing patentability of gene fragments known as ESTs
(expressed sequence tags),197 means that any one downstream company seeking to develop a
commercial end-product must negotiate with a multitude of upstream rights holders, any one
of whom has the power to hold up the product.198
As Ben Depoorter and Francesco Parisi suggest, courts should take into account: (i)
the number of copyright holders; (ii) the degree of complementarity between the copyrighted
inputs; and (iii) the degree of independence between the various copyright holders.199
Additional factors courts should also take into account include: (iv) the second generation
author’s degree of uncertainty as to the value of any one input or the value of the final
product; (v) the extent to which potential hold-up problems would unduly deter second
193 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111
HARV. L. REV. 621, 675 (1998). This is not actually an intellectual property piece but much of its subsequent
application has been in intellectual property, see, e.g. Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents
Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998) (Anticommons theory applied to
patents on gene fragments and other biological materials).
194 See, Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
195 Heller, supra note 193, at 624.
196 Heller and Eisenberg, supra note 193. (A proliferation of intellectual property rights upstream may
be stifling life-saving innovations further downstream in the course of research and product development)
197 An Expressed Sequence Tag is a tiny portion of an entire gene that can be used to help identify
unknown genes and to map their positions within a genome. See, National Center for Biotechnology
Information, A Basic Introduction to the Science Underlying NCBI Resources, available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/est.html.
198 This is especially problematic in the context of royalty stacking and reach-through license
provisions. See Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399,
442 (noting that NIH guidelines strongly discourage the use of Reach-Through Royalties)
199 Ben Depoorter and Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation, 21
INT'L REV. L & ECON. 453 (2002). (Concluding that “viewed in light of the anticommons theory, fair use
doctrines retain a valid efficiency justification even in a zero transaction cost environment.”)
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generation authors; and (vi) whether transactions are too heterogeneous to allow market
based solutions to develop.
These factors can in turn be incorporated into the common law doctrine of fair use
and provide a more discriminating basis for determining the allocation of the burden of
establishing whether the market is working or not. Returning to the application of fair use to
criticism, quotation and review, it seems unlikely that market driven opt-in mechanisms
would develop given that authors, sensitivity to criticism, expectation of criticism and
countervailing desire for publicity are all heterogeneous.200
In addition to considerations arising from game theory and behavioral economics,
some of the recent literature on industrial organization and intellectual property may also
identify situations in which the consequences of market failure will be most severe, and
therefore where an over-inclusive fair use standard is preferable to an under-inclusive
formulation.201
In summary, the market failure approach to fair use does take account of the role of
private ordering in determining the optimum scope of the copyright owner’s rights.
However, a more nuanced approach to determining whether it is the defendant or the
plaintiff carries the burden in relation to market failure would improve the approach.
2. Doctrinal efficiency
To the extent it effectively forecloses opportunities for the application of the fair use
doctrine, the market failure test is appealing in terms of administrative efficiency. However,
adopting the market failure test in its current form would constitute a significant expansion
of copyright scope. Invariably requiring the defendant to establish market failure implicitly

200 Another is that reviews uncompromised by the author’s consent generate more significant positive
externalities than reviews with permission.
201 See, Wu, supra note 29.
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assumes that the copyright owner’s rights are absolute and that any deviation from those
rights requires substantial justification. This formulation does not sit well with the either the
text of the Copyright Act, or the case law applying the fair use doctrine. All of the copyright
owner’s exclusive rights under the Copyright Act are expressly qualified as “subject to” fair
use.202 Although the courts have been less than clear as to the exact procedural status of fair
use,203 the fact that, procedurally, fair use must be asserted as an affirmative defense,204 does
not mean that it is always the defendant who carries the burden of proof once the defense
has been properly raised.205
In short, the market failure approach to fair use would be doctrinally efficient, but if
applied in its current form it would also significantly expand the scope of copyright. As
suggested above, the market failure approach would be improved if it was modified to
include a more discriminating allocation of the burden of proof. Admittedly, modifying this
rather arbitrary feature of the test would reduce the efficiency of the doctrine to some degree,
but trade would seem to be worthwhile.
3. Variation in the scope-welfare relationship
The third metric asks whether the recommended application is feasible in light of the
expectation that there will be substantial variation, both within and between industries, in the
welfare-scope relationship. Gordon’s market failure test addresses this by calling for a cost202 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2005). Note also that the existence of the fair use doctrine has advantaged
copyright owners as a class by enabling their rights to be broadly defined in the first place. See, Sag, supra note
63.
203 Compare, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (U.S. 1984);
with Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
204 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001). See also, Bateman
v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 (11th Cir. 1996).
205 The Supreme Court’s Sony decision implies that the burden of establishing fair use shifts according
whether the defendant’s use was “commercial” or “non-commercial.” Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (U.S. 1984) (“If the Betamax were used to make copies for a commercial or
profit-making purpose, such use would presumptively be unfair. The contrary presumption is appropriate
here…”). See also, Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“Game Genie users are engaged in a non-profit activity. Their use of the Game Genie to create derivative
works therefore is presumptively fair.”)

62
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art42

MATTHEW J. SAG

COPYRIGHT SCOPE AND FAIR USE

DRAFT 10/26/05

benefit analysis in the event that the defendant is able to establish market failure. This
necessarily incorporates a case-by-case cost-benefit analysis, and thus takes on all of the
problems of that approach, as discussed in Part III. C. below.
There is however, no reason that a market failure approach must incorporate a costbenefit analysis. The market failure approach accounts for variation in the efficiency of
private ordering, which in turn is a significant determinant of variation in scope-welfare
relationship generally. Once a court has determined that the relevant market should be
presumed to have failed, or has been shown to have failed, a cost-benefit analysis seems
unnecessary.
Consequently, viewed in its best light, the market failure approach to fair use
addresses the variation in the scope-welfare relationship by focusing on a substantial cause of
that variation – the efficiency of private ordering.
4. Overall assessment of fair use as market failure
The clear strength of the market failure approach to fair use is that it recognizes the
centrality of the efficiency of private ordering and is responsive to variation in the efficiency
of private ordering. The primary weakness of the market failure approach is its uniform
allocation of the burden of proof with respect to the existence of market failure. This feature
both predisposes the test to false positives, and is inconsistent with the judicial application of
the fair use doctrine.
In the final analysis, the market failure approach to fair use performs well when
assessed against the metrics developed in this article, but the metrics also highlight ways in
which the market failure test could be improved. Principally, the market failure approach to
fair use should adopt a more discerning basis for allocating the burden of proof. One method
of doing this is to apply some of the observations form game theory, behavioral economics
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and industrial organization to identify scenarios where the market is likely to fail, or scenarios
in which the potential consequences of market failure justify a presumption that errs in favor
of finding fair use.
C. Applying the metrics to cost-benefit approach
1. The efficiency of private ordering
In contrast to the explicit focus of the market failure test, the cost benefit approach
to fair use only considers the efficiency of private ordering by implication. The cost benefit
approach presumes that courts can vary the application of copyright according to the
author’s need for copyright incentives. Given the high degree of judicial dexterity already
assumed by the cost benefit approach, it seems reasonable to assume judges could also take
into consideration the likelihood that rights will be effectively redistributed by the market.
In the ideal case, a judge with perfect information could exactly tailor the application
of the fair use doctrine to maximize net social welfare, i.e. to find the optimal level of
copyright scope. In reality, this is quite infeasible, but even if it was possible, the costs of
such an exercise would overwhelm the benefits. In the alternative, the ability of a judge to
make the same kind of determination in a more generalized, industry-wide cost-benefit
analysis is also questionable. This is because a test-case decision on the fairness of a particular
use may be needed before copyright owners can be expected to establish workable market
mechanisms. For example, one could argue that the Supreme Court’s Sony decision was illadvised because, if the Court had found time-shifting was not fair use, content producers and
technology manufacturers would have inevitably negotiated some kind of compensation
system to allow the technology to develop.206 So, while the fact that a particular set of facts

Or a statutory royalty may have been imposed by either the courts or the legislature. See, Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 499 (1984)
206
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has resulted in litigation may itself indicate a specific failure of private ordering, that failure
itself may have been the product of legal uncertainty rather than defective market structure.
In summary, the cost benefit approach to fair use fails to offer a plausible method to
evaluate and or respond to the variation in the efficiency of private ordering.
2. Doctrinal efficiency
The second metric by which law and economics doctrinal recommendations should
be assessed relates to doctrinal efficiency. As discussed in Part II, even if preliminary
economic analysis suggested expanding the scope of copyright would result in a net welfare
improvement, the posited welfare benefits must be off set against any welfare losses
associated with the particular doctrinal change used to implement that change in scope.
Failure to account for the high costs and speculative benefits of asking judges to fine tune the
scope of copyright is the main defect of the paradigmatic cost benefit approach to fair use.
Although both Fisher and Lunney are somewhat vague about the level of detail to
which a cost-benefit analysis should descend, both suggest that courts should analyze the
balance of competing interests of the copyright owner and the public; and that resulting
balance should then be applied to determine whether a particular use is fair or foul, based on
its net contribution to social welfare.207 Fisher and Lunney each acknowledge the practical
difficulties inherent in resolving fair use cases through a judicial cost-benefit analysis, yet
both also advocate that approach nonetheless.208

Lunney, Sony Revisited, supra note 145, at 999, Fisher, supra note 145, at 1699.
Lunney argues that “[a]lthough striking such an ideal balance in every case remains beyond the
reach of our current legal and economic understanding, we can come considerably closer to the ideal balance by
examining the competing public interests directly, rather than by continuing to rely on the four nineteenth
century factors.” Lunney, Id., at 999. Similarly, Fisher asks rhetorically “[i]f such a comparative analysis must be
employed in most cases, is not economic analysis in this doctrinal context hopelessly impracticable? … Even so,
the analysis may have considerable value. The assumptions used … were not wildly unrealistic. Some of the
conclusions reached by the hypothetical judge may survive transition to the real world. Moreover, a simplified
version of the procedure might enable a court at least to increase allocative efficiency, if not to maximize it.”
Fisher, Id. at 1718-19.
207
208
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Lunney is particularly detailed about what he thinks courts should do. He argues that
in order to prevail against an assertion of fair use, copyright owners should demonstrate both
that the use in question presents a “meaningful likelihood of actual or future harm” to the
value of the work,209 and that such harm will translate into a negative marginal effect on the
output of creative works.210 If, and only if, both reduction in market value and reduction in
incentives are established by the copyright owner, should courts then balance the harm to the
copyright owner with the public’s interest in allowing the use to continue nonetheless.211
Some clue as to the extent of particularization required by Lunney’s approach is
found in his examples. Lunney illustrates the logic of his cost-benefit analysis through a
detailed analysis of the economics of allowing unauthorized time-shifting of broadcast
television through digital video recorders.212 Lunney’s intricate cost-benefit analysis of timeshifting would require a court to determine, (i) the correlation between advertising and
consumer spending, (ii) the ratio of advertising to content on broadcast television, (iii) the
extent to which consumer exposure to advertising has diminishing returns, (iv) the average
consumer’s reduced consumption of advertising, and (v) the extent to which other forms of
broadcast based advertising, such as product placement, would counteract the effect of
commercial skipping DVRs.213
A highly specific cost-benefit analysis of the economic efficiency of granting (or
denying) fair use appears to be both fundamentally impractical and inherently speculative.
These concerns are addressed in turn.

Lunney, Sony Revisited, supra note 145, at 1000.
Id., at 1023.
211 Id.
212 Id., at 1000 – 1014.
213 This fifth consideration was not mentioned by Lunney, which further illustrates the difficulty of the
task he envisages. See Lunney, Sony Revisited, supra note 145.
209
210
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First, although courts are capable of deciding complex questions of fact and weighing
expert testimony across a whole range of issues, the notion that a highly specified costbenefit analysis would be an efficient use of scarce judicial resources strains credibility. The
extensive industry surveys and lengthy economists’ briefs required to answer such questions
are likely to exceed the patience of most courts and the resources of most parties. As many
fair use cases involve new technologies, courts should be particularly “mindful of the
limitations facing judges where matters of technology are concerned.” 214
Second, finding the optimum level of copyright scope for any given market is
inherently speculative. For example, a court asked to rule against the use of lengthy plot
summaries in film reviews would have to consider the following: (i) the potential increase in
revenue to the copyright holder from licensed plot summaries; (ii) the effect of that potential
increase in revenue on the production of films; (iii) the potential decrease or increase in the
public’s enjoyment of film reviews; and (iv) the likely effect on the public’s demand for films.
As with Lunney’s own example of the DVR, the net welfare consequences are extremely
uncertain and could easily tip one way or the other based on minor changes in the court’s
underlying assumptions.
Adding to this impracticality is the possibility of unforeseen interactions between
variables. The peculiar economics of intellectual and creative output may result in
unauthorized uses actually benefiting copyright owners,215 in spite of vigorous protestations
to the contrary. An unauthorized use might expand the market for the original work and
214 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2792 (2005) (Justice Breyer concurring).
(“Judges have no specialized technical ability to answer questions about present or future technological
feasibilility or commercial viability where technology professionals, engineers, and venture capitalists themselves
may radically disagree and where answers may differ depending upon whether one focuses upon the time of
product development or the time of distribution.”)
215 Gregory M. Duhl gives three examples of this perverse effect: unauthorized fan comics in Japan,
unauthorized home video recording, and unauthorized music sampling. See Gregory M. Duhl, Old Lyrics, KnockOff Videos, And Copycat Comic Books: The Fourth Fair Use Factor In U.S. Copyright Law, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 665,
668. (2004).
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thus benefit the copyright owner. The Sony decision provides the paradigm example: in 1981
the head of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) told Congress that “the
VCR is to the American film producer and the American public as the Boston strangler is to
the woman home alone.”216 And yet, MPAA members now earn a significant proportion of
their revenues from VCR sales and DVD sales;217 the Boston strangler was never so
generous. The Supreme Court’s willingness to speculate as to the potential market expansive
effects of unauthorized uses in what was widely perceived as a test case, does not itself
suggest that courts should routinely engage in this kind of speculation, or that similar cases
should be reargued whenever there is a minor change in the underlying economics of the
broadcast industry (such as a demographic shift) or the technology of home recording (such
as a faster fast-forward button).
Of course, impracticality is not necessarily fatal to a proposed legal reform; the
suggested course of action can be taken as aspirational, not literal. Fisher argues that courts
would benefit from implementing his proposed cost-benefit analysis in spite of its practical
limitations. According to Fisher, the method has value as a means through which courts
might at least “increase allocative efficiency, if not to maximize it.”218 However, a highly
specified cost-benefit analysis of the merits of fair use is not simply an unrealistic ideal, it is
fundamentally ill-conceived. The root of the problem is that a highly specified cost-benefit
analysis trades doctrinal efficiency for the promise of more perfect allocative efficiency, a
promise that is in most cases simply illusory.

216 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, H.R. 5250,
H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong, 2d Sess. 5 (1982) (statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion
Picture Association of America).
217 According to the MPAA, there was a $22 Billion market for DVDs and VHS tapes in the U.S.
alone in 2002. See, Motion Picture Association of America, 2003 Piracy Fact Sheets: US Overview, available at
http://www.mpaa.org/PiracyFactSheets/PiracyFactSheetUS.pdf.
218 Fisher, supra note 145, at 1719.
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In addition to its practical limitations in any given case, the benefits of a highly
specified cost-benefit approach to fair use are almost certainly outweighed by its broader
effects on the copyright system. First, an individuated cost-benefit analysis is inconsistent
with the general universality of the copyright law. Copyright vests equally in grocery lists and
love letters, which do not depend on copyright’s incentives for their production and
distribution, as well as novels and encyclopedias, which typically do. The extent of copyright
protection does vary from work to work, because of the requirements of the idea-expression
distinction, but this modification is independent of any assessment of the need for
incentive.219 Asking courts to fine-tune copyright protection based on an assessment of the
author’s need for incentive runs contrary to the universalism of the current copyright system.
As the Fifth Circuit held in Mitchell Brothers:
Congress has concluded that the constitutional purpose of its copyright power, to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, is best served by allowing all
creative works (in a copyrightable format) to be accorded copyright protection
regardless of subject matter or content, trusting to the public taste to reward creators
of useful works and to deny creators of useless works any reward. 220
Indeed, the more case-specific rules become, the less point there is to having a
copyright system at all. As Louis Kaplow observed in relation to the intersection between
antitrust law and patent law:
In theory, direct reward systems are preferable because they avoid the monopoly
costs associated with a general patent system. A central reason for reliance on a
patent system is that it is thought to be too difficult to determine the appropriate
level of reward fairly and accurately on a case-by-case basis. 221

See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (Copyright in a factual
compilation is thin. Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use the facts
contained in another's publication to aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work does
not feature the same selection and arrangement.)
220 Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1979) (quotes
omitted).
221 Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1844 (1984).
219
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The same reasoning applies to copyright and fair use. The cost-benefit logic suggests
that, in every single case or at least in a highly specified subset of cases, judges should
attempt to perfectly balance the author’s incentive requirements with the public benefits of
increased access. In any individual case, this analysis is unlikely to be able to be properly
undertaken by any judge. In the aggregate, if this approach were taken, any welfare gains
achieved by fine-tuning copyright scope would be outweighed by the losses in doctrinal
efficiency. Doctrinal efficiency in copyright necessitates both under-protection and overprotection; consequently, even copyright pessimists must endure some measure of optimism
for the sake of an efficient universal system. In terms of the copyright system generally,
highly specified cost-benefit judging would make copyright legislation redundant. Indeed, the
logical conclusion of the cost-benefit approach is that legislative guidance on copyright law
should be entirely replaced by individually crafted judicial determinations of rights.
Second, any benefits of applying a cost-benefit approach to fair use in individual
cases would also be outweighed by its broader effects on the copyright system, because the
narrow fact findings of such cases would have little or no value as precedent. In our
common law judicial system, litigation has both a private and public benefit: it resolves
disputes between the parties and develops and/or clarifies the law for the benefit of all
society.222 If fair use decisions were arrived at by comparing the precise social value of
additional authorship resulting from prohibiting an unauthorized use against the social value
of allowing the unauthorized use to continue, subsequent cases with similar facts could be
decided differently based only on esoteric questions of valuation or minor changes in the
underlying markets. The cost benefit approach invites the losing plaintiffs in the Sony case to
start litigation all over again in response to demographic changes or shifts in consumer tastes.
222

__
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Any change in these factors could tip the balance of competing interests between the
copyright owners and the public, even though none of them relate to the actions of VCR
manufacturers.
The chilling effect of law without significant precedent value poses a significant
threat to continued innovation in technologies that have both infringing and non-infringing
uses and to free expression more generally. The entire purpose of the staple article of
commerce doctrine applied in Sony is to provide ex ante certainty to those who develop new
products.223 The aim of the staple article of commerce doctrine is clearly undermined if the
results of litigated cases are so easily disturbed as the logic of a cost benefit analysis implies.
As Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Grokster explains, without the ability to rely on the
existence of a substantial non-infringing use:
Inventors and entrepreneurs (in the garage, the dorm room, the corporate lab, or the
boardroom) would have to fear (and in many cases endure) costly and extensive trials
when they create, produce, or distribute the sort of information technology that can
be used for copyright infringement. They would often be left guessing as to how a
court, upon later review of the product and its uses, would decide when necessarily
rough estimates amounted to sufficient evidence. They would have no way to predict
how courts would weigh the respective values of infringing and noninfringing uses;
determine the efficiency and advisability of technological changes; or assess a
product's potential future markets. The price of a wrong guess -- even if it involves a
good-faith effort to assess technical and commercial viability -- could be large
statutory damages (not less than $ 750 and up to $ 30,000 per infringed work). 17
U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). The additional risk and uncertainty would mean a consequent
additional chill of technological development.224
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on a case-by-case approach to fair use does not
suggest that all traces of precedent should be removed from fair use jurisprudence.225

MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2791 (2005) (Justice Breyer concurring).
MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2793 (U.S. 2005).
225 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577, 581 (1994) (The task is not to be simplified with
bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis.); Harper & Row,
471 U.S. 549, 561, 597; Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 495 (1984).
223
224
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Indeed, the Court has crafted broad fair use exemptions for both parody and criticism which
are entirely untethered to a cost benefit analysis. As the Court clearly stated in Campbell:
[T]here is no protectable derivative market for criticism. The market for potential
derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general
develop or license others to develop. Yet the unlikelihood that creators of
imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions
removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market.226
Congress has clearly indicated that the courts should continue to develop the fair use
doctrine through the common law.227 The common law requires the development of
principles, not the mere determination of cases. Decided cases should offer some guidance to
copyright owners and members of the public alike, as to which activities are likely to be
infringing and which are not.
Doctrinal efficiency is far more than just a question of the frequency of litigation.
Reliance on the judicial process (or an administrative process) magnifies the level of
uncertainty faced by all potential parties and multiplies opportunities for strategic behavior.228
As I have suggested elsewhere, it may be the case that the uncertainty costs of a flexible fair
use doctrine are worth the benefits,229 but it would still be wise to try to keep those costs
contained. In its paradigm form, the cost-benefit approach treats welfare as purely
determined by the sum of costs and benefits in individual cases, without regard to either the
costs of state action or the likely multiplication of cases and threats of litigation.

226 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994). Admittedly, the clarity of this statement is
somewhat diminished by the Court’s insistence that the adjudication of fair use cases is “not to be simplified
with bright-line rules.” Id. at 277.
227 In enacting 17 U.S.C. § 107, Congress meant to restate existing judicial doctrine of fair use, not to
change, narrow, or enlarge doctrine in any way, and intended that courts continue common law tradition of fairuse adjudication. See, Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
228 See Part II. C., supra.
229 Sag, supra note 63.
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3. Variation in the scope-welfare relationship
The third metric that can be used to assess law and economics doctrinal
recommendations focuses on the variation and complexity of the scope-welfare relationship.
It asks whether the recommended application is feasible in light of the expectation that there
will be substantial variation, both within and between industries, in the welfare-scope
relationship. The paradigm case by case cost-benefit analysis clearly addresses the need to
account for variation in the scope-welfare relationship, but it must be rejected under the
doctrinal efficiency criteria for the reasons given above. A more broadly based cost benefit
approach to fair use, one that varied industry by industry, as opposed to case by case, avoids
most of the gross doctrinal inefficiency of the paradigm model but necessarily trades off
greater efficiency for a less nuanced account of variation in the welfare-scope relationship.
Arguably, the paradigm case is just an idealization, and is not meant to be taken
literally. However, even if we assume that a cost-benefit approach should be applied in a
more general fashion, to classes of works, rather than individual works,230 we are still left with
the problem of deciding where to draw the boundaries between classes.
As briefly discussed in Part II, although tailoring specific doctrines to the need for
incentives in particular industries may be desirable in theory, its application is hazardous.
There are at least five hazards worth exploring:
(1)

Industries are constantly evolving, thus industry definitions are inherently
fluid and resist legal definition;

(2)

Legal proceedings may become dominated by questions of taxonomy as the
parties lobby for competing industry definitions;

Loren seems to indicate the former, Lunney the later. See Loren, supra note 147, at __; Lunney,
Sony Revisited, supra note 145.
230
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Intra-industry variation may be just as significant as inter-industry variation
depending on the level of generality of the industry definition used;

(4)

Inter-industry effects are likely to be ambiguous;

(5)

Industry tailoring may have negative effects on the overall political economy
of copyright law.

This is not to suggest that industry tailoring is never appropriate, rather that its feasibility
must be carefully considered. However, an industry tailoring approach to the fair use
doctrine seems particularly unworkable for all of the reasons given above.
The first three hazards relate to the difficulty of defining exactly where one industry
stops and another begins. Although a number of authors have recommended a status driven
approach to fair use, one that preferences educators, scientists and news reporters,231 it is by
no means clear what the boundaries of any of these classes might be.
The broader the industry definition used, the more likely it is that intra-industry
variation be as significant as the inter-industry variation which supposedly justified a tailored
approach to fair use. But even within a fairly narrow industry definition, such as computer
software, incentive effects and requirements for copyright protection can differ. As Yochai
Benkler argues, expansionist intellectual property regimes tend to favor some producers and
disfavor others, depending on their information production strategy.232 Open source
software and commercial software often compete side by side in the market place, but their
production strategies are radically different. So in spite of being in the same industry,
information producers may well differ in their reliance on direct appropriation of their
information outputs, they will be differently affected by an expansion of intellectual property

See, e.g. Fisher, supra note 145, at 1744.
Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Production, 22 INT. REV. OF LAW
AND ECON. 81 (2002).
231
232
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rights. The more a producer relies on direct appropriation of its information outputs, the
more likely it is to find that the increased costs of greater copyright scope are matched by
increased revenues.233 In contrast, information production strategies that rely on indirect
appropriation and non-monetary gains are likely to be prejudiced by an increase in copyright
scope.
The fourth consideration is that even if a court was presented with sufficient
evidence to determine the optimal level of copyright scope for a particular market, it would
then have to consider how changes in one market might distort other markets. For example,
finding the optimum trade-off between increasing incentives and reducing the cost of
expression for a particular genre of novels might distort the downstream market for screenplays in the same genre, some of which are derived from novels and some of which are not.
However well intended, tilting the scales of copyright in one market is likely to have
unintended consequences and potential multiplier effects in other markets. These judgments
need to be based on sound theoretical approaches and/or broad based empirical evidence,
not merely a cost-benefit analysis of one narrow case or class of cases.
The fifth consideration is that an industry level cost-benefit analysis would
significantly expand opportunities for rent seeking in copyright law. If judges explicitly craft
rules to apply differently to particular industries, the ability of those industries to lobby
Congress for particularized benefits will only increase. While there are numerous examples of
special interest rent seeking in the current copyright law, this type of particularism is limited
by the universalism of copyright. As such, industry based cost-benefit rules may well subvert
the aims of their proponents.234

Id., at 83.
Dan Burk and Mark Lemley raise a similar concern with respect to industry differentiation in patent
law. Although Burk and Lemley have advocated tailoring patent protection to the needs of specific industries in
233
234
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4. Overall assessment of the cost benefit approach to fair use
In its paradigm form, the cost benefit approach to fair use fails to account for the
high costs and speculative benefits of asking judges to fine tune the scope of copyright.
Various applications of the market failure approach have been rightly criticized for simply
presuming the efficiency of private ordering without any serious empirical or theoretical
inquiry.235 The opposite criticism can be leveled at the cost-benefit approach to fair use. The
implicit assumption of the cost benefit approach to fair use is that every litigated fair use case
represents a failure of private ordering and that such failures will continue even after judicial
resolution of like cases. The cost-benefit approach is also limited by its failure to recognize
the significance of the significant costs associated with its (arguably futile) pursuit of more
perfect allocative efficiency.
Is there an alternative? An industry based cost-benefit analysis of fair use incorrectly
focuses on the status of the defendant, rather than the nature of her conduct. An alternative
approach to fair use that may meet many of the objectives of the cost benefit approach is to
concentrate on identifying situations in which fair use should be presumed. Such an
approach is consistent with the current doctrinal framework of fair use, can be incorporated
into the general market failure framework and lends itself to the application of economic
analysis in the form of game theory and many other analytical tool-sets.

light of industry based variation in economic evidence, patent doctrine, and legal theory, they concede that there
are a number of risks inherent in such a technology-specific approach. In particular, they acknowledge because
of “concerns about rent seeking and the inability of industry-specific statutes to respond to changing
circumstances, … we should not jettison our nominally uniform patent system in favor of specific statutes that
protect particular industries.” Burk and Lemley, supra note 123, 1578-79. However, as Polk Wagner points out,
these political economy concerns should not be confined to legislative particularism. R. Polk Wagner, Exactly
Backwards: Exceptionalism and the Federal Circuit, 54 Case W. Res. 749, 755 (2004).
235 See Cohen, supra note 8, at 465 (criticizing the assumptions of those who predict the irrelevance of
fair use in cyberspace as unproven and unjustified in the case of creative and informational works.)
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CONCLUSION
The traditional single variable analysis of the welfare effects of copyright protection is
bedeviled by empirical uncertainty as to the optimum level of that protection. The traditional
model is a useful tool for thinking about the efficiency of copyright as a whole, but as a
launching pad for recommendations about individual copyright doctrines, it is more limited.
Conclusions as to optimum copyright protection do not directly translate into doctrinal
recommendations, because any given level of copyright protection can be engineered
through an infinite number of combinations of copyright protection’s constituent variables –
copyright scope and copyright duration.
This article has suggested two extensions of the traditional model that address this
limitation. The first extension is to simply set aside the issue of duration and focus on
copyright scope. This is useful for analyzing specific copyright doctrines, and has very little
distorting effect because of the extraordinary length of modern copyright terms. The second
extension of the traditional model is to relax the assumption that there are no differences
between the welfare effects of different combinations of doctrinal settings that result in the
same level of copyright scope. This article formalized the notion of doctrinal efficiency as
concept separate from, but ultimately related to, the ideal extent of copyright scope.
Building on both of these extensions to the traditional model, this article explored the
relationship between copyright scope and welfare from a theoretical perspective to develop a
framework for evaluating specific doctrinal recommendations in copyright law. This analysis
leads to four conclusions, three of which in turn provide useful metrics or benchmarks for
assessing doctrinal recommendations. The first (by no means novel) conclusion is that the
ideal extent of copyright scope must be both more than nothing, and less than everything.
The more tractable implications of the theoretical exploration of the relationship between
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copyright scope and welfare are: (1) the efficiency of private ordering is the key determinant
of the ideal level of copyright scope; (2) the complexity of the welfare-scope relationship is
such that we are unlikely to be able to ascertain a generalizable optimal level of copyright
scope – the relationship will clearly be subject to substantial variation, both within and
between industries; (3) doctrinal recommendations which aim to optimize copyright scope in
the abstract but do not account for the effect of a doctrinal change on transaction costs or
uncertainty are necessarily incomplete.
This article bridges the gap between the traditional law and economics of copyright
and specific doctrinal analysis by applying the above conclusions as metrics for assessing
doctrinal proposals. The metrics do not definitively determine which doctrinal proposals are
either efficient or normatively desirable, but they are useful in both filtering out some illconceived recommendations, and identifying areas for improvement in others. The
application of these metrics to the predominant law and economics theories of fair use
illustrates the approach and its potential. This metric driven analysis demonstrates the general
robustness of the market failure approach to fair use and the relative frailty of the competing
cost benefit approach. Importantly, the application of the metrics also indicates how the
market failure approach can be improved.
This article’s main substantive recommendation with respect to the fair use doctrine
is that the market failure approach should be modified to incorporate a more discerning basis
for allocating the burden of proof. One method of doing this is to apply some of the
observations from game theory, behavioral economics and industrial organization to identify
scenarios where the market is likely to fail, or scenarios in which the potential consequences
of market failure justify a presumption that errs in favor of finding fair use. This approach is
preferable to an industry tailored cost benefit approach because it asks courts to focus on the
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nature of the defendant’s conduct, not her broader status or affiliation. Courts should
continue to develop the common law of fair use and attempt to identify situations in which
the failure of the market for permissions should be presumed. Courts already appear to
make this presumption with respect to parody, criticism, review, trivial quotation and the
reverse engineering of computer software. This situational approach preserves the flexibility
of the common law, is easily incorporated into a market failure framework, and lends itself to
the application of sophisticated economic analysis in a form that courts can actually use.
The applicability of the metrics developed in this article is by no means limited to fair
use. Another significant issue in copyright that remains unresolved is the extent of secondary
liability for infringement and the correct application of the Sony standard with respect to
substantial non-infringing use.236 A number of commentators have suggested reformulating
the law of secondary liability to hold technology providers liable for failure to take reasonable
steps to prevent infringing uses of their products or services. 237 A cost benefit analysis
suggests that liability should extend up to the point that the technology provider’s cost of
prevention equals the social benefit of reducing copyright infringement.238 This is not the
place to critique this notion in detail, suffice to say that the uncertainty such a rule would
create in the boardrooms of Silicon Valley would be immense.239

236 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2778 (U.S. 2005) The opinion of the Court
was confined to the issue of secondary liability through active inducement, and “did not revisit Sony further …
to add a more quantified description of the point of balance between protection and commerce when liability
rests solely on distribution with knowledge that unlawful use will occur.”
237 See, Douglas Lichtman and William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic
Perspective, 16 HARV. J. LAW & TEC 395, 404-05 (2003); Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 910-11 (2004). See also In re
Aimster Copyright Litigation. 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003) (“When a supplier is offering a product or
service that has noninfringing as well as infringing uses, some estimate of the respective magnitudes of these
uses is necessary for a finding of contributory infringement.”)
238 Id.
239 A point forcefully made by Justice Breyer in his concurring opinion in Grokster. MGM Studios Inc.
v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2792-2793 (U.S. 2005) (Increasing the burden on defendants “would
doubtless make life easier for copyrightholder plaintiffs. But it would simultaneously increase the legal
uncertainty that surrounds the creation or development of a new technology capable of being put to infringing
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The point of raising this example is not to debate its merits, but rather to show that
the methodology developed in this article has broad application. By revising and extending
the traditional model of the welfare effects of copyright to produce applicable metrics, this
article translates abstract economic theory into concrete recommendations for individual
copyright doctrines.

uses. Inventors and entrepreneurs (in the garage, the dorm room, the corporate lab, or the boardroom) would
have to fear (and in many cases endure) costly and extensive trials when they create, produce, or distribute the
sort of information technology that can be used for copyright infringement.”)
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